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1 Introduction 
The issue of gender equality continues to be an issue on the global agenda, even on into the 
21
st
 century. There has been substantial progress towards global gender equality, but great 
disparities still persist. Women in many societies face substantial gaps in the division of 
household responsibilities, limitations in educational opportunities and economical resources, 
as well as legal and structural barriers to political power (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 4-5). 
In the „60s and the „70s economic growth was emphasized as the most effective strategy for 
achieving human development and improving the living conditions and the status of women, 
and there was hope that economic development would automatically benefit women in poorer 
societies. By the end of the twentieth century, the limitations of growth were clear, and it has 
since become clear that the problems of gender equality are more complex and intractable 
than the early theorists assumed (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 4-5).  
Gender equality is still a topic of debate, and although there has been substantial progress 
towards gender equality in much of the world, great disparities still exist (Norris and Inglehart 
2003: 3). Because of the great differences existing between countries, a great amount of 
research on the causes of gender inequality has been performed. After the limitations of 
economic growth as a key to improve the status of women became clear, researchers found 
that cultural barriers helped to explain a great deal. Nevertheless, systematic survey evidence 
monitoring cultural attitudes toward gender equality across many societies remains scattered 
and inconclusive (Inglehart and Norris 2003:10). 
However, we have seen that rising gender equality has been a part of a global trend. Gender 
equality is a central tenet of what in the Western world
1
 is considered to be democracy.  And 
democracy is spreading - as are democratic values and egalitarian attitudes (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005: 284). Democratization and rising gender equality go hand in hand, and they are 
among the recent worldwide movements towards a more prosperous everyday life for many 
women.  
South Africa is a country which is part of this global trend, and has gone through major 
structural changes in a short period of time, including improved living conditions and 
improvements in the social status of women. Since South Africa had its first free election in 
                                                 
1
 With the term “Western World” I refer to Western Europe, Northern America, Australia and New Zealand.  
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1994, the country has not only changed from the apartheid regime into a legitimate 
democracy, but has also gone through economic and social developments. As a part of this 
process, South Africa has gained the status of a “gender promoting” nation, and has been 
ranked as one of the world‟s most gender equal countries by the World Economic Forum‟s 
Global Gender Gap index (Hausmann et. al. 2010). These developments have clearly led to 
structural changes in the lives of South African women, but this does not necessarily indicate 
that the attitudes towards gender equality held by South Africans themselves has changed. I 
would argue that changing social structures are necessary for this development, and that such 
changes might lead to acceleration in the “rising tide” towards gender equality2.  
1.1 Research Questions 
The thesis will thereby be concerned with two main research questions:  
1. How have attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa changed over time? 
2. What can explain variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa? I.e., 
do differences in social structure explain the variation in this matter or can different 
value dimensions provide a better explanation?  
Both research questions are addressing South Africa‟s population on an individual level. The 
study will explore why there presumably is a gap between two types of gender equality in 
South Africa: the integration of women in South African society on an aggregate level, and 
the traditional values and negative attitudes towards gender equality found in the population 
on an individual level
3
. In addition, I seek to examine the attitudinal variations present, both 
among individuals and over time. By doing this I am at the same time testing whether revised 
theories on modernization, cultural and value change can be used in explaining attitudinal 
variation in a developing country.  
To explore the variations in attitudes towards gender equality over time, the focus will be on 
finding out which explanations are the most fruitful: Value-based explanations or structural 
explanations. According to Ronald Inglehart (1997) modernization leads to value change. 
Inglehart and Norris (2003) have found that value changes have led to changes in attitudes 
                                                 
2
 “The Rising Tide” is the title of Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris’ book on gender equality, referring to the 
rise in worldwide gender equality. 
3
 By “aggregate” level I am referring to the national level. 
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towards gender equality. However, modernization takes much longer than 17 years. I 
nevertheless expect the process of modernization undergoing in South Africa to have led to 
changes in terms of attitudes towards gender equality at this point, and I wish to explore if 
such changes are detectible in South Africa in this time period.  
I will look at the variations and the changes over time by using data from World Value 
Survey, with data collected in South Africa in four surveys in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007. I 
will be doing a statistical analysis, using the OLS method of regression analysis and the effect 
change design. I will be discussing this in detail in chapter four. The moment of democratic 
transition
4
 (1990-1994) is relevant because gender egalitarianism is a one of core ideas of a 
democratic society. Not only did South Africa become a democracy at that time, but the 
country also experienced a change in its societal structure. I wish to explore how the situation 
is now, as compared to at the time of the democratic transition.  
1.2 Overview and background 
Before 1990 South Africa was a non-democratic, discriminating society, as the country was 
governed by an ethnic minority while the majority of the population was living under poor 
conditions (Seekings 2007: 1-3). From 1990 to 2007 the country‟s GNI per capita5 increased 
from 3,220 US$ to 5,730 US$ (UN data 2011). Compared to the economic developments in 
many European countries, the “miracle” of East Asia and American developments, this 
increase is not of great dimensions, but it is nevertheless an impressive improvement for an 
African country. Even though disparities exist and other factors play a role, research has 
found a positive relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction (Roemer and 
Gugerty 1997: 9). Also, we know that the countries in the world with the highest standard of 
living are, with few exceptions, democracies (UNDP 2010). 
In South Africa, the democratic transition began around 1990, and in 1994 the country had its 
first democratic election. South Africa is unique in an African context, because of its late 
democratization, the history of apartheid, and the country‟s economic development. The 
                                                 
4
 Apartheid ended in 1990 and the first democratic election was in 1994.  
5
 Gross national income (GNI) comprises the value within a country (i.e. its gross domestic product) together 
with its income received from other countries, less similar payments made to other countries (Cf. Lequillier and 
Blades 2006). 
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southernmost state of Africa is also the most advanced economy on the African continent 
(Butler 2009: 55).  
South Africa is nevertheless no unique case in having experienced structural societal change 
in its recent past. Since the Second World War and throughout the past decades the world has 
changed radically. Particularly the Western world has changed, and concepts such as 
“modernization” have been established when conceptualizing these changes. Democracy is 
spreading and so are democratic values and egalitarian attitudes. In the western world and in 
affluent democracies egalitarian attitudes are included in the democratic society (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005: 284). It has taken a long time, but now women have achieved a socio-legal 
status equal to men, including the right to vote, to participate politically, to have a working 
career, and several other rights when claiming gender equality in large parts of the world. 
South Africa has done well in a regional context, also in terms of gaining gender equality. In 
the Global Gender Gap report, published yearly by the World Economic Forum (WEF)
6
, 
South Africa was ranked as the 12th most “gender equal” country in the world in 2010. The 
ranking of countries is based on four indicators: Women‟s economic participation, education, 
political participation, and health and living conditions of women. The high ranking is much 
due to South Africa‟s impressive work in bringing women into parliaments, something which 
began immediately after the ANC
7
 took over the government.  Major changes have occurred 
for the women in South Africa since before the democratic transition, with the 1994 election 
resulting in women comprising 27% of all parliamentarians (Goetz 1998:250). This happened 
largely to ANC‟s internal quota system, and pushed South Africa from almost the bottom of 
the world classification of women in national parliaments to close to the top. This was a 
tremendous change, given that the total number of women in parliament had never previously 
exceeded eight (Geisler 2000: 606). 
Today, women in South Africa are participating in politics and the labor force to a large 
extent, as compared to other developing countries. The radical changes towards gender 
equality have been politically initiated. During the 1990s the South African government 
started up several initiatives to improve the status of women (Geisler 2000: 610-616). 
                                                 
6
 “The World Economic Forum is an independent organization committed to improve the state of the world, by 
engaging business, political, academic and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry 
agendas” (WEF 2011).  
7
 ANC: African National Congress, the political party that won the 1994-election, and it has won every election 
since. 
5 
 
Political and economic quotation was introduced in the country. The ranking of South Africa 
as a gender equal country is thus elite-initiated, promoted by politicians who are likely to 
belong to the higher classes of society in terms of education, income level and profession.  
South Africa is at an early stage of the development process, compared to countries in 
Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Americas. Thus, the introduction of gender equality policies 
in South Africa was, in that sense, not a natural stage of their development.  Rather this is 
something that has been introduced by politicians, initiated by a strong women‟s movement in 
the early „90s (Hassim 2005: 180-182). Reaching the same level of gender equality in politics, 
has taken a long time in countries that are gender equal today. The great rise of women in the 
Norwegian parliament happened during the 1970‟s and 1980‟s (Stortinget 2010), which was 
at a late stage in Norway‟s developmental process, as compared to South Africa.  
In 2010 South Africa was ranked number 110 out of 169 countries on the HDI index, with a 
value of 0.597 (UNDP 2010). South Africa is an agrarian society (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 
34). Research has shown that people living in societies with a high degree of traditional 
values can be expected not to have gender equality as a prioritized topic of concern (Inglehart 
and Norris 2003:155-156). We can expect South Africa to be a society with high degree of 
traditional values; thus, it is unlikely that the majority of South African citizens would place 
gender equality as a topic of high concern.  
Research has shown that there is a strong and significant relationship between attitudes 
towards women in politics and the actual proportion of women in parliament (Inglehart and 
Norris 2003: 138). It is not yet confirmed that more women in parliament will lead to more 
“female-friendly” policies, or that egalitarian values in society have an effect on the 
democratic process, but some research has showed that there might be such a relationship 
(Reynolds 1999: 549). If such a relationship exists, a change towards more positive attitudes 
towards gender equality could indicate an increasingly democratized South Africa.  
Hopefully, if we gain a better understanding of the relationship between gender equality on 
the aggregate level in developing countries on one hand and the attitudes held by the citizens 
on the individual level on the other, we might improve our understanding of how to carry on 
the rising tide of global gender equality. 
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1.3 Why South Africa? 
It is a fact that radical changes in attitudes towards gender equality in the western world have 
occurred (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 3). In the non-industrialized world, including Africa, the 
topic has not been given the same attention. All countries on the African continent are still 
under development and undergoing societal changes. South Africa is chosen as the case of 
study because South Africa is a developing country where gender equality is a contemporary 
topic of debate, and because South Africa is at a point in its history where one can except to 
see undergoing structural changes, both on an aggregate and individual level. As mentioned, 
South Africa has gone through a rapid transformation from an underdeveloped non-
democracy to an increasingly industrialized democratic nation in two decades.  
In addition to the present economic and the political changes, South Africa is an interesting 
object of study due to its unique history of apartheid. The country has experienced a long and 
recent history of societal inequality, and has been a society where non-egalitarian attitudes 
were deeply rooted. During the period of apartheid, major inequalities existed between the 
different ethnicities and this relationship of inequality from the past has since affected the 
policies chosen by the post-democratic government. Despite the development process, South 
Africa is still a developing country with the majority of the population holding onto 
traditional and survival values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:57). People holding these values 
are likely to be more negative towards gender equality than people holding the opposite - 
secular-rational and self-expression values (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 153-156). 
As a result, South Africa‟s highly ranked position on the Global Gender Gap index is not due 
to societal change “from below”. Instead, it is caused by the actions from the women‟s 
movement and politicians within the ANC. The number of women in South African politics is 
a direct result of a gender promotion strategy adopted in 1997, including the use of gender 
quotas (Cf. Bauer 2006; Geisler 2000). All the countries in the Southern African region 
(SADC)
8
 have been adopting the same strategy, but few with results as positive as those in 
South Africa.  
                                                 
8
 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization. The members 
are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
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The politicians of South Africa and other developing countries have prioritized putting gender 
equality on the agenda, a value which is strongly linked to the “modern world”. This leads to 
the core of my thesis: What tendencies can be found in terms of attitudes towards gender 
equality in a country undergoing development, structural and societal changes, while at the 
same time strategies towards more gender equality are implemented? Are these strategies only 
giving South Africa international status, or are they actually changing the lives of women on 
an individual level? 
1.4 Disposition of the Thesis 
Chapter two will focus on the theoretical background of the study, providing definitions and 
giving explanations of the relevant concepts. Central is the difference between attitudes and 
values, and how these concepts are interconnected. Moreover, I will the differences between 
structural and values based explanations. I will present parts of the work of Ronald Inglehart, 
the theories of value change and how these theories are relevant for the study of attitudes 
towards gender equality in South Africa. Further on, I will describe the different value 
dimensions I will be using in this study. I will present fifteen hypotheses based on the 
theoretical background I am presenting, stating what results I am expecting to find in the 
analysis. 
Chapter three will be an introduction to the South African case clarifying the context of the 
study. A brief historical background focusing on the Apartheid-regime and the transition to 
democracy will be given, and the focus will be on understanding what South African society 
looked like before democracy in 1994 and the years before that, and how South Africa has 
changed since 1990. I will also give brief background information on relevant issues in the 
South African context. In this chapter I will also present some data on the social status of 
women in South Africa over time to provide some background information, and present some 
indicators explaining the economical situation of South Africa and data from the United 
Nations placing South Africa in a comparative perspective on Human Development 
indicators.  
In chapter four I will present the dataset I am using, in addition to the operationalization of the 
different variables and a presentation of the use of regression analysis as a method of analysis. 
Moreover, I will discuss the challenges I face by using survey data and other methodological 
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difficulties, including a discussion of the validity and reliability of the study. I will also 
present the effect change design, which I am using to interpret my findings, and what 
advantages and disadvantages I can expect when using these methods of analysis and design. 
In addition to the operationalization of the dependent and the independent variables, I will 
present some detailed information about the variables, such as their mean values and standard 
deviations.  
In the fifth chapter I will address the first research question: Whether attitudes towards gender 
equality in South Africa have changed over time. I will present a correlation matrix, showing 
the correlations between the dependent variable and all the dependent variables over time, and 
discuss my findings from the bivariate analyses. 
In chapter six I show the results of sequential regression analyses with attitudes towards 
gender equality as the dependent variable. The results are presented in four tables. I will 
analyze the results by using the effect change design based on Hellevik (1988). I will go 
through the hypotheses presented in chapter two and all hypotheses will either be confirmed 
or not confirmed based on my findings. I will also go through what has been my main 
findings over time, and I will discuss briefly what I believe might be the reason in those cases 
where I get unexpected results from the analysis.  
Chapter seven will include concluding remarks, based on the results of the correlation matrix, 
the bivariate analyses and the four sequential analyses. Here I will conclude to what extent the 
analysis provided sufficient results to answer the research problems I addressed. I will 
summarize with my main findings and I will focus on the changes I have seen over time, and 
the effects that appear to be the most important ones. I will present a review of the fifteen 
hypotheses I presented in chapter two in a table which gives an overview of the results of the 
topics addressed in the hypotheses in all four survey years. I will conclude by commenting on 
any tendencies that I have discovered in the results of my thesis.  
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2 Theoretical background 
2.1  Introduction 
The work in this thesis is based on the theoretical concepts of gender equality, attitudes, and 
values. Furthermore, I wish to explore whether theories created to explain social change in the 
developed world can also be used for explaining social change in a developing country. These 
theories include concepts such as modernization, postmodernization, materialist-, and 
postmaterialist values.  
In this chapter I will present these central theoretical components, and briefly explain how 
they are expected to be interconnected. Moreover, the central aim of the thesis is to study how 
attitudes towards gender equality have changed over time and what may be the reasons for 
any such changes in South Africa. In order to explore this, I have chosen to focus on two 
different paths of explanation: structural explanations and value-based explanations. The 
structural explanations are based on the work of Daniel Bell (1976), Harold Wilensky (2002) 
and Johannes Bergh (2006) on the subject. A number of works published by Ronald Inglehart 
concerning modernization and cultural change form the basis of the value-based explanations. 
Ronald Inglehart has found that societal change in Western Europe has led to certain 
predictable changes in people‟s set of values, something which he refers to as a revised 
modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 15-22). Based on his findings Inglehart has 
found that two value-dimensions can explain a great deal of this variation: a traditional-
secular dimension and a materialist-post-materialist dimension (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 
20, 97-106). There is to be an interconnection between people‟s positions on the value-
dimensions and their attitudes towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 15-18). In 
addition to these two value dimensions, I will include a third value dimension, the left-right 
materialist dimension, which is based on the findings of Oddbjørn Knutsen (1995) and 
Johannes Bergh (2006). 
First I will present a conceptual description of gender equality, values, and attitudes. Based on 
the definitions of gender equality and attitudes I will present what I am going define as 
attitudes towards gender equality in the thesis - what definitions form the basis of  my 
operationalization. This leads to a minor discussion on the predicted relationship between 
gender equality, attitudes and values. I will also present the causal model that forms the basis 
10 
 
on my thesis. Further on, I will present the structural variables I am using in this thesis and the 
theories regarding the structural explanations. In addition, I will introduce the value 
dimensions and the theories related to value change. I will present the differences between 
“old politics” and “new politics”. This will lead to a brief discussion on Inglehart‟s work on 
“new politics”, modernization, and postmodernization and his findings based on data gathered 
from the World Value Surveys. Lastly I will present my argument and the hypotheses based 
on my argument.  These are the hypotheses I am going to test in the analyses in chapter five 
and six.  
2.2 Gender equality 
The term gender refers to socially constructed roles and learned behavior of women and men 
associated with the biological characteristics of males and females (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 
8).  
Gender equality can be difficult to define, because there is no single definition of the concept. 
One label that may be used could be equal opportunity or the promotion or the advancement 
of women, but also emancipation, equality, or empowerment of women (Lombardo et. al. 
2009: 1). However, gender equality can lose its dynamic when fixed to one particular 
understanding (Lombardo et. al. 2009: 3).  
Since the meaning of gender equality is not explicitly given, several different definitions of 
gender equality exist. Generally gender equality describes equality between men and women, 
traditionally what has been called simply “equality” (Cf. Hirsch 2010). The idea of equality is 
something which is included in the idea of human dignity. Human beings in themselves 
deserve respect from laws and social institutions. This is an idea that has many roots in the 
worldwide democratic ideal (Loutfi 2001: 45). Even though no simple definition exists; 
specific aspects of gender equality are universal, such as access to education, political rights, 
and employment. 
According to Mason (2001), in a gender equal society, women and men are entitled to the 
same social, legal, and economic rights.  More specifically, “a gender system is a set of 
beliefs and norms, common practices, and associated sanctions through which the meaning of 
being male and female and the rights and obligations of males and females (…) are defined“ 
(Mason 2001:161).  
11 
 
Inglehart and Norris state that in societies where a culture of gender equality predominates, a 
climate is provided where de jure legal rights are more likely to be translated into de facto 
rights in practice. In such a society women embrace expanded opportunities to attain literacy, 
education and employment (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 8). In the Rising Tide, when 
comparing gender equality in different societies, the indicators used are measuring women‟s 
employment, their level of education, the contraceptive prevalence rate, the percentage of 
very young mothers, the degree of female literacy, a gender-related HDI-index, and female 
empowerment (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 37). 
The Global Gender Gap report 
The Global Gender Gap report, published annually by the World Economic Forum, states 
gender equality in the following way: “The report examines the gap between men and women 
in four fundamental categories: Economic participation and opportunity, educational 
attainment, political empowerment and health and survival” (Hausmann et. al. 2010:4). The 
four pillars form a concrete framework for defining and measuring gender equality. This 
index ranks countries according to their proximity to gender equality, rather than to women‟s 
empowerment, and uses 14 different indicators in order to form the four pillars (Hausmann et. 
al. 2010:5).  
The first pillar, economic participation and opportunity
9
, is measured by female labor force 
participation, wage equality between women and men for similar work, estimated female 
earned income, female legislators, senior officials and managers, and female professional and 
technical workers.  
Pillar two, educational attainment, is measured by educational attainment, female literacy 
rate, female net primary level enrolment, female net secondary level enrolment, and female 
gross tertiary level enrolment. 
Pillar three, health and survival, is measured by female healthy life expectancy and sex ratio 
at birth.  
The indicators forming pillar four, political empowerment, are the number of women with 
seats in parliament, women at the ministerial level, and the number of years with a female 
head of state or government (Hausmann et. al. 2010: 5). 
                                                 
9
 All indicators are converted to female over male ratio. 
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United Nations’ Gender Inequality Index 
The United Nations‟ Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women‟s disadvantages in three 
dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Reproductive health 
is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates, while empowerment is 
measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by each gender and attainment at secondary 
and higher education by each gender. Economic activity is measured by the labor market 
participation rate for each gender. This index replaces the previous Gender-related 
Development Index and Gender Empowerment Index used by the UN. The GII shows the loss 
in human development is due to inequality between female and male achievements in the 
three GII dimensions (UNDP 2011). The aggregation of the GII dimensions is done to capture 
the inequality between women and men. The GII is expressed as the relative difference 
between two means: the harmonic mean and the reference mean. The reference mean is 
obtained assuming equality of genders in all three GII dimensions (UNDP 2011).  
On this index, South Africa was ranked as number 82 in 2008, much lower than on the Global 
Gender Gap index (UNDP 2010). 
Gender empowerment 
Perhaps the most important factor when speaking of an increased level of gender equality in 
South Africa is that women have entered the political arena and the national economy to an 
increased degree. Gender empowerment can be measured by the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM). The GEM measures women‟s participation and is calculated by tracking the 
number of seats in parliament, the number of female legislators, senior officials and 
managers, and the number of female professional and technical workers, in addition to the 
gender disparity in earned income (UNDP 2007/2008).  
In her analysis of the steps which women must overcome on their way up the parliamentary 
system, Nina Raaum use four institutional thresholds developed by political scientist, Stein 
Rokkan (1970; 1987): 1) Legitimization, the stage where women conquer public space for 
their interests; 2) Incorporation, the introduction of universal suffrage and the right to stand 
for election; 3) Representation in parliament; and lastly 4)  The executive power, the 
achievement of cabinet and ministerial power (Raaum 2004: 137-139). In South Africa, black 
women overcame these four steps almost “over night” in 1994.  
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Indicators addressing gender equality 
In this thesis I am going to use the indicators used in the Global Gender Gap report, the GEM, 
and the Global Inequality Index as a framework for my own definition of gender equality, in 
addition to my own assumptions. 
Also, I will address the division of gender roles in the home and in the family in my 
definition, as also done by Inglehart and Norris (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 31). In this 
indicator I will include that women should be able to have children without depending 
economically on a man, that women should have the right to choose not to have children. In 
practice, this includes access to paid birth leave, legalized abortion, and access to 
contraceptives. I regard the following six main indicators/questions as overall measures of 
gender equality: 
i. To what degree should men and women have the same access to education? 
ii. To what degree should men and women have the same access to employment? 
iii. To what degree should men and women have the same access to health care, food and 
other necessities? 
iv. To what degree should men and women have the same access to political 
empowerment? 
v. To what degree should men and women have the same family rights (division of work 
in home/family)? 
vi. To what degree should a woman be independent of a man, in order to have and to raise 
children and to keep a family?  
Hence, in a society with equality for men and women, the answer to all questions is “full 
degree”. 
2.3 Values 
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is 
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence. Moreover, a value exists in a state along a continuum of relative importance 
(Rokeach 1973: 5). A value is a single belief and transcends objects and situations; it is a 
standard (Rokeach 1973: 18).  
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Van Deth and Scarbrough define values as something that cannot be observed, they can 
engage moral considerations and they are conceptions of the desirable (Van Deth and 
Scarbrough 1994: 28).  Moreover, values appear to be crucial in explaining social and 
political change. Milton Rokeach argues that the antecedents of human values can be traced to 
culture, society, and its institutions, and that the consequences of human values will be 
manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth investigating 
and understanding (Rokeach 1973: 3).  
Political values are prescriptive beliefs which individuals would like to see implemented in 
the political system (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 125). Value orientations often originate in 
socio-political cleavages. Moral value dimensions and economic left-right values are often 
referred to as “old politics”, while “new politics” refers to value conflicts emerging from post-
industrial society (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 125). Other ways of conceptualizing “new 
politics” is by including an environment versus economic growth value dimension, or a 
materialist-non-materialist value dimension. It is reasonable to argue that the materialist-
postmaterialist value dimension incorporates significant aspects of the other post-industrial 
dimensions (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 126). Therefore I do not see it as necessary to include 
all three in this analysis.  
The central value dimension that will be used when analyzing the relationship between value 
orientation and attitudes towards gender equality are: 
The central value dimensions in the thesis 
1. Religious versus secular values 
2. Materialist versus post-materialist values 
3. Economic left versus economic right values. 
The first and the third value dimensions mainly measure “old politics”, whilst the second 
dimension measures the presence of “new politics”. According to Bergh (2006) all three value 
dimensions can be expected to be connected to attitudes towards gender equality.  
2.4 Attitudes 
The two concepts of attitudes and values are connected, but they are not one in the same and 
must therefore be distinguished from one another. An attitude differs from a value in that an 
15 
 
attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation 
(Rokeach 1973: 18). 
First, attitudes always have an object of reference, and one always has an attitude towards 
something or someone. Also, attitudes are usually pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, well-
disposed or ill disposed, and so on. One is not necessary solely negative or positive, one can 
be ambivalent, but usually both negative and positive attitudes towards the concept exist 
(Allport 1961: 347).   
Contrary to values, attitudes are no basic and unchangeable elements in someone‟s 
personality, but they last much longer than a moment. Therefore, they are relatively lasting 
(Knutsen 1985:8).  
2.5 The Culture shift 
Due to societal changes a substantial change has happened in relation to attitudes and values. 
According to Ronald Inglehart, this “silent revolution” in advanced industrial societies has led 
to a culture shift, including a change of values and the modernization of society. 
During the past 60 years it has become apparent that specific cultural changes have happened 
in the industrialized world. In The Silent Revolution (1977), Ronald Inglehart argues that a 
shift from materialist to postmaterialist values has happened in the industrialized world. In 
Culture Shift in advanced Industrial Society (1990) it has become apparent that this is only 
one aspect of a much broader syndrome of cultural change, involving the decline of 
traditional religious orientations and conventional social and sexual norms (Inglehart 1990:7). 
In Modernization and Postmodernization (1997), Inglehart claims that the changes have led to 
a shift of values.  
Modernization theory is used to explain the modernization of societies, and the central claim 
of modernization theory is that industrialization is linked with special processes of socio-
political change (Inglehart 1997: 8). Modernization theories originated in the works of Marx, 
Weber, and Durkheim (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 11). The theory has been much disputed 
because the central claim is that virtually all societies will be changing in the same direction, 
with social progress and the development of societies. According to modernization theorists, 
underdeveloped countries have been expected to change culturally in the same matter as the 
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western world did, regardless of their own culture and heritage. As a response to 
modernization theorists, one of the main findings in the „80s was that cultural change in non-
western societies did show patterns very different from those discovered in the industrialized 
west (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:17-20).  
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris present a revised modernization theory connected to 
gender attitudes
10
 in The Rising Tide. They form a hypothesis stating that human development 
brings changed cultural attitudes toward gender equality in virtually any society that 
experiences modernization linked with economic development (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 
10). According to Inglehart and Norris, modernization does bring systematic and predictable 
changes in gender roles, through two key phases: industrialization and post-industrialization. 
Industrialization brings women into the paid workforce, with natural consequences. Post-
industrialization introduce more women to management and political influence. These two 
phases correspond to two dimensions of cross-cultural variation, namely a transition from 
traditional to secular-rational values and a transition from survival to self-expression values 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003: 11). 
In the early stages of industrialization there might be forces both leading to the increase of 
women‟s rights and at the same time weaken informal family networks that disproportionately 
hurt women‟s interests. Societal modernization both expands opportunities for women, while 
others create new inequalities (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 21). The best explanation for the 
increased worldwide gender equality is the welfare state and the increasing self-expression 
values (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 283). 
There are three basic reasons for the decline of traditional religious and sexual norms in 
advanced industrial societies: an increasing sense of security, the welfare state replacing the 
family, and changing traditional worldviews. The increasing sense of security diminishes the 
need for absolute norms. Societal and religious norms usually have some functional basis; 
many of these norms have become less crucial. The welfare state has taken over many of the 
previous tasks of the family. People‟s traditional worldviews have changed, due to the lack of 
consistency between the world as it was painted in the tradition of the Old Testament and the 
world as it appears now (Inglehart 1994: 177-179).  
                                                 
10
 Attitudes towards gender equality will also be referred to as “gender attitudes” in the thesis.  
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South Africa is a non-industrialized and a traditional society. One cannot yet expect to find 
the same patterns of cultural development in South Africa as in the west. Inglehart (1997: 
268) already established through the World Value Survey performed in South Africa in 1981, 
that there were few post-materialists in South Africa at the time, in addition to few differences 
between the young and the old in having such values. In former value surveys the data from 
South Africa also showed that the country in the 1980‟s experienced a movement away from 
postmodern values. From 1980 to 1990 the South African population became less 
postmaterialist than earlier - something which can be explained by the economic and political 
instability in the country in the „80s (Inglehart 1997: 276). In the same period South Africa 
also shifted toward greater emphasis on religion, thus emphasizing the importance of more 
traditional and religious values (Inglehart 1997: 284). 
However, South Africa has experienced major economic changes and increased prosperity 
during the 1990s. Therefore I assume that this should have led to a change in the population‟s 
set of values, and that their values have become more postmaterialist. If this is the case, then 
one can expect to find more self-expression values and secular-rational values in South Africa 
in 2001 and in 2007 than in 1990 and 1996, and these values are linked to gender equality 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003: 153-156). Thus, this possible change of values might have led to a 
change towards more positive attitudes towards gender equality. 
2.5.1 Attitudes towards gender equality 
Briefly stated, attitudes towards gender equality are attitudes that concern gender relations in 
society (Bergh 2006: 6). As stated above, there is an object of reference involved, in this case 
gender, and it is a measure of how people perceive different aspects of gender equality.  
Over the last 40-50 years, people in advanced industrial societies have seen a change in 
people‟s attitudes towards gender equality (Bergh 2006: 5). In advanced industrial societies 
this is linked to a change of social structure and value change. In traditional societies, gender 
is generally linked to the religious and biblical meaning of gender roles. Therefore, attitudes 
towards gender equality are strongly linked to religion (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 53-64). 
The societies around the Western world used to be much more religious and traditional, and 
the view that a woman‟s place was in the home prevailed in western societies well into the 
twentieth century (Chhibber 2003: 186).  Thus, we can expect to find such attitudes in a 
country under development, such as South Africa.  
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In this thesis six dimensions form the basis for the definition of attitudes towards gender 
equality, based on the dimensions related to gender equality. E.g. a person with very positive 
attitudes towards gender equality would for find that women should have the same right to 
education as men, that women should have the same right to any job as any man, that women 
should have the same right to healthcare as men, that women must have all political rights and 
access to political power and that women should decide over their own family situation 
without being dependent on a man.  
The indicators are all indicators measuring different aspects of a gender equal society, and 
some of the indicators are likely to have a stronger effect on certain groups, and vice versa. It 
is likely that people in general find it more important that women should have an equal right 
to education, than women being equally talented political leaders. An equal right to education 
is usually implemented in a developing society before the right to equal political 
representation is, and therefore it is likely that less people have developed positive attitudes at 
an early stage of the political empowerment of women. Therefore I am using indices 
measuring different aspects of gender attitudes in this thesis. 
2.6 Explanations for change in gender attitudes 
By employing the modernization perspective on gender attitudes, one will come across at 
least two different accounts of how the change in attitudes came about, and why gender 
attitudes vary: a structural explanation and a values explanation (Bergh 2006: 5).  The two are 
not excluding one another, and the idea here is to present both, and to explore which account 
is more suitable for explaining possible changes in attitudes towards gender equality in South 
Africa in the period 1990-2007. This is done by including both structural variables and value-
based variables in four regression analyses and by studying statistical data. 
2.6.1 Causal model 
The causal model illustrates the effect of social structural background and values on gender 
attitudes. 
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Table 2.1 Causal Model 
 
The idea in this thesis is to explore how variations in attitudes towards gender equality in 
South Africa can best be explained: Which explanation variables are relevant and which are 
not. The causal relationship is that between the social structure the values and the gender 
attitudes of the South-African population. Social structure can have a direct effect on attitudes 
because there are no underlying effects. Structural explanations are defined by the social 
characteristics of the population. Social structure in this thesis is defined as age, gender, 
ethnicity, region, religion, urban versus rural place of residence, education, income, and social 
class. Values can both be determined by social structure and have a direct effect on attitudes.  
The thesis will examine whether the direct effect of social structure is stronger than the direct 
effect of values. By performing sequential regression analyses and by interpreting the data 
with the effect change design, I will be able to see if the effects are direct or indirect and 
which variables have the stronger effects on gender attitudes.  
2.6.2 Structural explanations for attitude change 
Harold Wilensky (2002) argues for a structural explanation of the changes in attitudes 
towards gender equality. Having studied rich countries, he discovers a continuous process of 
industrialization. The unskilled workers are no longer the dominant group, but the skilled 
workers are (Wilensky 2002: 186-187). It has become more costly to have children, and there 
is an increased need of educated labor.  
Wilensky (2002) says that with structural change women are receiving higher levels of 
education, and they are increasingly included in the workforce over time. When women work 
and study alongside men, the men become more accepting of women. Wilensky claims that 
individual gender attitudes are shaped by educational achievement and experience of gender 
relations on the individual level. On the aggregate level, a country‟s level of economic 
development should correlate with gender attitudes (Wilensky 2002: 28-30).  
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By industrialization Wilensky means the increasing and widespread use of 1) tools that 
multiply the effects of their initial applications of energy and 2) inanimate sources of energy. 
The convergence theory
11
 is based on the idea that as rich countries became richer, they 
developed similar economic, political, and social structures - and to some extent values and 
beliefs (Wilensky 2002: 3). 
Wilensky found that the more highly developed the country; the higher the female 
participation rate in the non-agricultural labor force (Wilensky 2002: 6). Ideology also plays a 
part, however, as Wilensky states that official ideology is a minor influence, and that a 
country‟s economic development is a crucial determinant of the status of women (Wilensky 
2002: 7).  
To measure the effect of social structure on attitudes towards gender equality, I will be using 
the independent structural variables of gender, age, and ethnicity, urban or rural place of 
residence, region, religious denomination, income, social class, and education. In the analysis, 
I will examine to what extent these factors affect gender attitudes, and how these effects are 
changing over time.  
2.6.3 Human values explanations for attitude change 
The basic idea behind changing attitudes is the same for both explanations: That 
socioeconomic development changes people‟s values, priorities, and attitudes in a number of 
ways (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 13). A reduction of poverty leads to less material constraints 
and people do not need to worry about basic needs. Moreover, when people gain increased 
levels of education and access to mass media this improves the spreading of information and 
the spreading of knowledge.  The development of society also diminishes cognitive 
constraints on human choice, something which is fuelling a sense of intellectual 
independence.  The change in the workforce is essential, and increased occupational 
specialization leads to a diversifying of human interaction. Over time, people increasingly 
free themselves from fixed categories such as gender and class. Economic change does lead to 
social change, change of values, and change of attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 12-15).  
                                                 
11
 The convergence theory states that all industrial systems would converge in their social, political and 
economic systems because of the determinant effects of technological development. 
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Ronald Inglehart has been a major advocate for the value explanations in change of attitudes 
(Bergh 2006: 8). The theory of Inglehart with regard to gender attitudes is that the 
predominant values of advanced industrial societies (especially post-materialist values) 
facilitates people‟s acceptance of women‟s self-realization and equality with men (Bergh 
2006: 9; Inglehart and Norris 2003: 63.69). When addressing the question of attitudes towards 
gender equality, there are two central value dimensions defined by Inglehart (1997) relevant 
in explaining this matter: the materialist-postmaterialist dimension and the religious-secular 
value dimension. Both of these dimensions change over time.  
The traditional/secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in 
which religion is very important and those in which is it not (Inglehart et. al. 2004: 10). 
Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of traditional family values; they 
reject divorce, abortion and suicide, and support a nationalistic outlook. Societies with 
secular-rational values have the opposite preferences (Inglehart et. al 2004: 11). The values on 
the materialist- and the postmaterialist value dimension reflect an intergenerational shift from 
an emphasis on economic and physical security toward one of increasing emphasis on self-
expression, subjective well-being and quality of life concerns (Inglehart 1990; 1997; Inglehart 
et.al. 2004).  
Moreover, self-expression values have the strongest effect on gender equality, regardless of 
which other explanations are included (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 282). Self-expression 
values are a result of postmodern values. Attitudes towards equal rights for women tend to be 
rejected in societies where survival seems uncertain, whereas they are increasingly accepted 
in societies that emphasize self-expression values. The responses to the question whether 
“Men make better political leaders than women” are very strongly correlated with the 
survival/self-expression dimension (Inglehart et. al. 2004: 14). 
Arguably, gender issues constitute the most central component of value change in post-
industrial societies (Inglehart et. al. 2004: 15). Johannes Bergh (2006) has found in his study 
of modernization and attitudes towards gender equality that values have a strong effect on 
attitudes towards gender equality. Bergh has studied 17 industrialized countries in Europe, 
America and Japan, but no non-industrialized countries. Therefore this may possibly be the 
case exclusively for industrialized countries.  
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Other scholars have added a third dimension: The economic left-right materialism dimension. 
This dimension stems from the industrial revolution and class conflict (Knutsen 1995: 2-3). 
Johannes Bergh refers to this dimension as “egalitarianism”. (Bergh 2006: 8). “Left 
materialism” refers to a belief in, and support for, equality, an active government and 
harmony between social classes. The other pole, “right materialism”, denotes support for 
personal freedom, a relatively weak government, and economic liberalism (Van Deth 1995: 
10). In other words, people holding left materialist values are likely to hold positive attitudes 
towards gender equality, linked to their support for equality and harmony between the classes. 
Thus the three value dimensions are used for measuring the value explanation when studying 
gender attitudes in this thesis: post-materialism, religiousness, and left-right materialism. 
2.7 Argument and hypotheses 
South Africa is ranked as a middle income country with traditional values, rather than secular, 
and the population has slightly more survival values than self-expression values. The religious 
values are very strong in South Africa. The country has a score of around 85 per cent 
(Inglehart and Norris 2004: 54). Studies have shown that the attitudes concerning religion and 
family show high levels of constraint (Inglehart 1990: 182). It is precisely those who have 
experienced the least economic security in their lives that have the greatest need for guidance 
from familiar cultural norms and religion (Inglehart 1990:185).  
South Africa is a society where traditional and religious values are strong; it is therefore 
unlikely to find a high presence of positive attitudes towards gender equality. However, since 
people are experiencing more economical and political security now than in 1990, I expect to 
see movements in the direction of more positive gender attitudes. 
I expect to find that the socio-structural variables will have the strongest effect on attitudes 
towards gender equality. This I expect because South Africa is at an early stage in the 
industrializing process, and has not reached the cultural change necessary for values to have a 
stronger effect on attitudes. At the same time, I expect to see a change over time – that the 
effect of values is increasingly important in explaining variations in gender attitudes in the 
period 1990-2007.  
A government‟s promotion of gender equality will affect people‟s values, but above all this 
development will manifest most concretely in the upper socio-economic level of society. 
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Some scholars have found that a very small portion of South Africans prioritize materialistic 
values (Kotzé and Lombard 2003: 200). I believe value differences can explain a great deal of 
the gender attitudinal variation, and I believe I will find that there are large socio-structural 
differences affecting gender attitudes. Moreover I assume that both the structural and the 
value-based explanations can be used for understanding the relationship between gender 
attitudes and the independent variables when I discuss the hypotheses.  
I have based the following hypotheses on my assumptions:  
2.7.1 Hypotheses 
H1: In South Africa, there has been a positive shift since the democratic transition, and South 
Africans have become steadily more positive towards gender equality. 
South Africa has become a democracy and experienced economic growth and modernization 
(Faulkner and Loewald 2008:1-5). Even though South Africa is at an early stage of 
modernization, I assume that these changes have led to people being more positive towards 
gender equality today than twenty years ago, based on the theories described in this chapter. 
The gender equality promotion strategy by the government is also likely to have affected 
people towards more positive gender attitudes.  
H2: Younger people are more likely to have positive attitudes towards gender equality than 
older people. 
Generational comparisons have provided indirect evidence in post-industrial societies that the 
traditional gender gap is strongest among the elderly (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 161). The 
change of attitudes is clear in affluent societies, but I believe it is reasonable to believe that 
this change also is occurring in developing societies. The younger people of South Africa 
grew up after the end of apartheid and with a more prosperous future and more economic 
security. The younger generation also experiences the gender promotion strategy 
implemented in the „90s. In affluent societies, younger generations are more likely to be 
positive towards gender equality than older generations (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 38). I 
expect to find the same tendency in South Africa.  
H3: Women are more likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than 
men. 
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In many nations today, women hold more left-leaning values than men. Included in these 
orientations are postmaterialism and gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 161). 
Inglehart and Norris (2003: 41) have found that there are differences between men and 
women with regards to gender equality in all three types of societies: postindustrial, 
industrial, and agrarian societies. Thus, this should also be the case for South Africa.  
H4: White South Africans are likely to be more positive than black, coloreds and Asians. 
Black South Africans are likely to be the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes 
towards gender equality. 
I expect to find differences between the ethnicities in attitudes towards gender equality 
because there are socio-structural differences between the ethnic groups. The income 
distribution among the South Africans has been in favor of the whites over a long time period, 
and it still is today (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13). The white ethnic group had economical 
advantages during apartheid and has been superior over the other ethnic groups. As discussed 
in chapter two, economic security leads to more postmaterialist values, which again leads to 
more positive gender attitudes. I assume the black population to be the most negative towards 
gender equality for the opposite reason. The black population has been the mostly 
disadvantaged ethnic group in South Africa over a long time period, thus I believe they have 
more traditional and religious values than the other ethnic groups, and consequently they are 
more negative towards gender equality than the other groups.  
H4B: White Afrikaans speaking South Africans are likely to be more negative towards gender 
equality than white English speaking South Africans. 
I base this hypothesis the assumption that the Afrikaans speaking white community has more 
traditional values that the English speaking white population. For example, the National 
Party
12
 has taken a more traditional perspective on women in politics, and opposing 
affirmative action and abortion (Goetz 1998:246). Since people holding more traditional and 
religious values are likely to be less positive towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 
2003: 153), I expect to find this tendency among the Afrikaans community.  
                                                 
12
 The National Party was the ruling party during apartheid and had mainly white Afrikaans-speaking members.  
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H4C: The white population of South Africa has gained more positive attitudes over time, 
while in the black population attitudes towards gender equality have not remarkably changed 
since the democratic transition. 
Some groups of the South African society have become even better off after the transition, 
whilst others experienced a decline in their economic situation, including expanding within-
race inequality (Faulkner and Loewald 2008: 6-7). In South Africa there is still a racial divide 
in terms of economical differences. The white population had a better starting point in 1990, 
and they have increased their living standard over this period of time. From 1993 to 2008 the 
white population of South Africa increased its per capita income level from ZAR46 486 to 
ZAR75 295
13
 (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13).  Due to the theories of societal changes that were 
discussed in chapter two, the white population is more likely to have gone through a shift of 
values, which has led to a shift of attitudes towards gender equality. The black population on 
the other hand, has not experienced a large change in economical terms, and is still the ethnic 
group with the lowest income level, far below the other ethnic groups (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 
13). Thus, since this ethnic group has not experienced many changes towards more 
economical security, I do not expect to find major changes towards gender attitudes in this 
group.  
H5: People living in the cities are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than 
people living in the countryside. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) developed a framework for studying social cleavages in western 
democracies The urban-rural dimension sprang out of the industrial revolution and created a 
cleavage in the commodity market between peasants and others employed in the primary 
sector and those who wanted to buy the products of the primary sector, particularly the urban 
population (Knutsen 2006: xii). These two groups had opposite economic interests, and this 
gap between the urban and the rural population creates a divide between the two groups in 
terms of their belonging to different social classes.  
The social classes most likely to subscribe to post-materialist values in Western Europe are 
the new middle class, the better educated and the post-war generations (Inglehart 1997: 448-
252). I am expecting to find the same tendency in South Africa, that the social classes residing 
in urban areas, the middle class and the better educated, are more likely to hold postmodern 
                                                 
13
 Measured in constant 2000 South African Rands. 
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values, and thus be more positive towards gender equality. In South Africa an urban 
residential area may provide better access to areas of economic opportunity and to formal 
education.  
H6: There are no significant differences between different regions in South Africa in terms of 
attitudes towards gender equality, except for the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and 
the Western Cape, where the inhabitants are likely to be more positive towards gender 
equality.  
In the same study of the social cleavages of Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
identified the regional division as a center-periphery cleavage, associated with the national 
revolution. This was a conflict related to the central nation-building culture and the increasing 
resistance of the ethnically, linguistically and religious subject population in the provinces 
and the peripheries (Knutsen 2010: 556).  
In South Africa, wide variations in economic performance, job availability, and population 
structure divide the provinces. Jobs are extremely scarce in the rural provinces and poverty is 
widespread (Butler 2009: 44). Gauteng is the economic heartland of South Africa, accounting 
for more than a third of the Gross Domestic product (GDP) and contains both Johannesburg 
and Pretoria
14
. KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) hosts the nation‟s major port of Durban, and is the 
most populous province (Butler 2009:44). However, in the provinces of South Africa, the rich 
and the poor, and a number of different ethnic groups live side by side (Butler 2009:44-46). 
South Africa has also gone though a nation-building process during the time period studied in 
this thesis. After apartheid the government tried to unite the very diverse and scattered nation. 
However, I expect the nation building process in South Africa to have taken a different path 
than in Europe, and that the major social cleavages goes between the white and rich and the 
black and poor, rather than between the central provinces and the peripheries. Thus, I do not 
expect to find large differences between regions in South Africa with regards to gender 
equality attitudes, because most regions consist of diverse populations. However, I do believe 
that the inhabitants of Western Cape
15
, KZN and Gauteng to be more positive towards gender 
equality, due their proximity to the most important cities. 
                                                 
14
 Johannesburg is South Africa’s most populous city, while Pretoria is the executive capital.  
15
 The economically strong and politically important city of Cape Town is located in the Western Cape.  
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H7: People that do not belong to a religious denomination are likely to have more positive 
attitudes towards gender equality than people that belong to a religious denomination. 
Moreover; I expect to find that the Catholics and the Protestants are the least negative 
towards gender equality and that the Muslims are the most negative towards gender equality.  
An extensive body of work suggests that religion has functioned as one of the most important 
agencies of socialization determining social norms and moral values with regard to gender 
equality in all societies and influencing support for feminism and the women‟s movement 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003: 50). Inglehart and Norris (2003:67) have found that the type of 
religion matters far more for beliefs about gender equality than the strength of religiosity. 
They find that traditional religious values and religious laws have played an important role in 
reinforcing social norms and a separate and subordinate role for women as homemakers and 
mothers. The biggest gap they find is between the Islamic societies and religions found in the 
West (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 68). Reynolds (1999: 568-570) also finds that there are 
significant differences between women in parliament and the religious denomination held by 
the majority of the population when comparing many countries. Buddhist, Orthodox 
Christian, and Muslim countries have significantly lower numbers of women in parliament 
than do Catholic countries. Moreover, few mainstream religions can reasonably be interpreted 
as friendly towards the election of women to political office (Reynolds 1999: 551). Also, the 
literature shows that a Protestant religious heritage improves the status of women in a country 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003 and Alexander and Welzel 2007 in Jacobs 2009: 28). 
H8: People with higher levels of education are likely to be more positive towards gender 
equality than people with lower levels of education. 
Education has long been emphasized as a central factor in encouraging non-traditional 
attitudes (Kane 1995: 74). The explanations for this relationship can be divided into two 
groups, where the first emphasizes education as enlightenment and assumes that education 
can change the fundamental nature of inequality. The second assumes education‟s impact in 
such a way as to make it unrelated to any fundamental change and is implying that education 
reproduces rather than challenges inequality (Kane 1995: 74-75). The ones who argue for 
education and enlightenment, such as Lipset's (1960) notion, state that people are anti-
democratic until they are socialized by educational institutions stressing democratic values 
(Kane 1995: 75).  
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Wilensky (2002: 7) argues that the growth in the education level of women (and that of men) 
leads to women increasingly participating in the labor force, thus this is likely to result in 
more accepting attitudes towards gender equality amongst men. Men with higher educational 
levels are more likely to work alongside with women, due to the type of profession they enter 
after higher education, thus they become more tolerant of gender equality. Moreover, in their 
cross-national analysis of attitudes towards gender equality, Inglehart and Norris (2003: 47) 
find that support for gender equality was stronger among the well-educated. Regardless of the 
foregoing process, the impact of education level on attitudes towards gender equality is clear, 
and I expect to see the same tendency in South Africa. The effect of education I assume is a 
combination of increased enlightenment towards democratic and egalitarian values, in 
addition to social structural change leading to a change of values and attitudes, as women are 
introduced into the higher positions. 
H9: People with higher levels of income are likely to be more positive towards gender 
equality than people with lower levels of income. 
Owen and You (2009: 135) have found on an aggregate level that there is a relationship 
between income, attitudes towards women and the economic outcomes for women. High-
income professions usually means less emphasis on physical strength, and women are 
increasingly able to partake in the workforce (Owen and You 2009: 136). With increasing 
levels of income, both women and men are employed in new sectors and belong to other 
social classes that are more likely to have positive attitudes. In addition, with increasing levels 
of income, people are more economically secure, which leads to an increasing presence of 
post-material and self-expression values, as discussed earlier. This again, leads to more 
positive attitudes towards gender equality.  
H10: Respondents belonging to the unskilled workers class and farmers are likely to be the 
most negative towards gender equality. South Africans who are routine manual employees or 
belong to the service class are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender attitudes 
than persons belonging to the other social classes. 
According to Inglehart (1997) the new middle class in European countries will have more 
post-modern values and consequently be more positive towards gender equality. The middle 
class of South Africa in this thesis is defined as being comprised of mainly the routine manual 
employees and also the service class. As discussed in chapter two, I expect to find some of the 
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tendencies of the revised modernization theory in South Africa. Thus, I expect that the middle 
class of South Africa in addition to the service class also has more postmaterialist values and 
positive gender attitudes compared to South Africans belonging to the unskilled- and skilled 
working class and the farmers. 
H11: People with postmaterialist values are more likely to be positive towards gender 
equality than people with materialist values. 
As already discussed, based on the findings from the World Value Surveys, Norris and 
Inglehart (2003) have found that postmaterialist values are connected to self-expression 
values, which leads to more positive attitudes towards gender equality. 
H12: People with secular values are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender 
equality than people with religious values. 
Inglehart and Norris (2003: 71) found in their study that religiosity continues to exert a strong 
influence on social norms about the appropriate division of sex roles in the home, the work 
force, and the public sphere, especially in agrarian societies. At the same time they found that 
secularization combined with modernization has led to a fuelling of the rising tide (Inglehart 
and Norris 2003: 71). 
H13: People with leftist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than 
people with rightist values. 
Bergh (2006:8) argues that the left-right materialism value dimension taps the degree to 
which people hold egalitarian values. Since “left materialism” refers to a support for equality 
(Bergh 2006:8), I assume people holding more leftist values are more likely to have positive 
attitudes towards gender equality.  
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3 South Africa: A history of inequality 
and discrimination 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have introduced the theoretical background for the thesis, and I 
have stated some reasons for why it is scientifically interesting to study attitudes towards 
gender equality in South Africa. I have chosen to study gender attitudes in South Africa for 
two basic reasons: South Africa‟s history of inequality and the recent developments towards 
gender equality. South Africa has not gone through all phases of modernization, but it has 
gone through radical political and economic developments in a short time. It is relevant for 
understanding the results of the analysis to gain an understanding of the historic background 
of South Africa. History shapes society and will subsequently shape both the culture and the 
social structure of the population.  
I will give an historic background of the apartheid state and the democratic transition in South 
Africa. I will here focus on South Africa in the period of white rule, and the post-apartheid 
era, and I will not go into detail, but will rather provide simple background information. I will 
introduce some general facts about the economical and political situation of the country from 
1990 until today, and present statistical facts about women in South Africa in the period 1990 
to 2007 on some indicators, such as education, employment, politics, health, and life 
expectancy. I will conclude with what I can expect to find in my analysis on gender attitudes, 
with regards to empirical facts and the theoretical background.  
3.2 The Apartheid state 
The segregated state in South Africa was more extensive than in other colonial African states. 
Black people were not only politically and economically segregated from the white minority, 
in South Africa the native Africans were forced to reside in distinct ethnic homelands (Butler 
2009: 20). Many countries on the African continent were colonized and experienced minority 
rule by European settles. However, the apartheid state of South Africa was special because of 
the well-organized system; all inhabitants of South Africa belonged to a racial category. 
Moreover, the system lasted for so long. The apartheid state existed more or less from 1948-
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1990. It came to an end with the release of the opposition leader, Nelson Mandela in 1990, 
and South Africa has its first democratic election in 1994 (Butler 2000: 23-31).   
South Africa is one of the most complex societies in Africa south of Sahara, in terms of 
ethnicity. A number of different African tribal communities reside in South Africa and during 
the 18
th
 century the European search for gold and diamonds brought settlers from around the 
world there. The white population was divided into two main groups: The British and the 
Boers. The latter were descendants of settlers from Holland and Germany, and the language 
they came to speak was named “Afrikaans”. This language is also spoken by the large number 
of coloreds in South Africa today. The coloreds are a mixed race category, a result of white 
Afrikaners mixing with the native population, and with imported workers from other African 
countries and from Asia (Butler 2009: 37-40). 
The European interest in South Africa started in 1867, when diamonds were discovered and 
initiated foreign investment. Diamonds were soon overtaken by gold, discovered in 1886 
(Butler 2009: 12). The demands for stability and labor led the imperial power, the British, to 
break the resistance of the black African policies through military force. Britain‟s High 
Commissioner Miler viewed manipulation of black African chiefs as necessary to keep 
control over the colonial economy (Butler 2009: 13). There have been tensions between the 
European settlers ever since the beginning, when the “Boer War” between British and the 
Afrikaners was fought in 1899-1902, which the British ultimately won (Butler 2009: 10).  
The decade after 1910 saw continued English dominance and deepening racial segregation 
under the auspices of a political alliance between Afrikaner agriculture, white mine owners, 
and those dependent on them (Butler 2009: 14). From 1933-48, South Africa emerged from 
the depression into a second industrial revolution (Butler 2009: 14). The mid- to late 1930s 
marked the first high-point of segregation. Legislation passed in 1936 consolidated the native 
reserves and removed propertied Africans from the cape voter roll (Butler 2009: 15). The 
wartime economic bonanza of 1933-1948 saw a relaxation of segregation and an inexorable 
urbanization, and the number of blacks moving into towns was striking, and for the first time 
many of these were women (Butler 2009:15). 1948 was the year when the Nationalist party 
(NP)
16
 won the election, but the real beginning of apartheid in the sense it is remembered 
today was initiated in the 1960s. 1948 is the also the year of the population registration act, 
                                                 
16
 The Nationalist Party was the ruling party during Apartheid.  
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which enforced the classification of people into four strict racial categories: White, colored, 
Indian/Asiatic, and native (later Bantu or African)). In the years since the sixties more and 
more segregation laws were encompassed in South Africa (Butler 2009: 17). 
3.3 Transition to democracy 
A number of factors led to the final demolition of Apartheid, and as in the breakdown of most 
regimes, it is difficult to point to any single factor. Long-range international developments 
profoundly influenced the circumstances within which apartheid collapsed and a democratic 
settlement was ultimately negotiated (Butler 2009:23). The importance of technology transfer 
and international collaboration for modern industry redoubled these pressures (Goodman and 
Pauly 1993 in Butler 2009: 23). Ideological shifts among white intellectuals in the NP party 
and more contact with ANC
17
 leaders in exile and South African business leaders contributed 
to the fall of apartheid. There were also few ideological differences between NP and ANC, 
both parties were nationalistic and took the same stands of economical issues (Butler 2009: 
26). In addition, there was a massive international pressure placed upon the government, 
including economic sanctions (Levy 1999: 415-418). The end of Apartheid is best explained 
by structural economic changes and associated shifts in political organization, in combination 
with international factors (Butler 1998: 158).  
South Africa‟s first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, was imprisoned in 
1964 and he was released in 1990. The years from 1990 to 1994 were crucial in shaping 
modern South Africa. He was then elected president in 1994, which marked the start of the 
era of ANC rule. Nelson Mandela insisted on putting the past behind him, and requested all 
South Africans to do the same. White ministers were given positions in the government, and 
the president worked for reforms in favor of cooperation and non-segregation of the 
ethnicities. Yet some people claim that there has been no true revolution in South Africa. The 
black population has taken office, but this is not the same thing as taking power (Alexander 
2002: 60). The black population of South Africa is still underprivileged in terms of income 
and unemployment (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13).   
                                                 
17
 ANC:  African National Congress. ANC has won every election since 1994 with more than 62-70 per cent of 
the votes. 
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South Africa is one of the youngest democracies in the world. However, South Africans 
started with political activism and mobilization long before the democratic change actually 
took place. The democratic transition was initiated in 1990 with the release of ANC-leader 
Nelson Mandela, and the country had its first democratic election in 1994. After the first 
democratic election, the country has gone through major changes throughout the past 20 
years. After Mandela left office, Thabo Mbeki held office from 1999-2008, followed by Jacob 
Zuma who is the president of South Africa today. ANC has been the dominant party since 
democratization, and receives the majority of the votes
18
. Essentially the reason is that party 
support goes along racial lines. The majority of the black population continues to vote for 
ANC (Habib and Taylor 1999: 110).  
3.4 The Socioeconomic status of South Africans 
3.4.1 Ethnicity 
South Africa is a country consisting of a large number of different ethnicities, where the 
majority is of native black African heritage. In the population censuses from South Africa in 
2010 and 2001 the population by “race” and “mother tongue was as follows: 
Table 3.1: Population by mother tongue 2001 
Primary Household Language % of population  
IsiZulu 23,9 
IsiXhosa 17,6 
Afrikaans 13,3 
Sepedi 9,4 
English 9,2 
Setswana 9,2 
Sesotho 7,9 
Xitsonga 4,4 
SiSwati 2,7 
Tshivenda 2,3 
IsiNdebele 1,6 
Other  0,5 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2003 (Butler 2009: 36). 
 
 
                                                 
18
 In 2004 ANC won 69.69% of the vote and in 2009 the ANC won 65.90% of the seats.  
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Table 3.2: Population by race 2010 
Race % of population 
African 79,4 
White 9,2 
Colored 8,7 
Indian/Asian 2,7 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2010. 
3.4.2 Provinces 
The population of South Africa in 2010 was estimated to 49, 99 million people (Statistics 
South Africa 2010). The population of the South African provinces is as follows:  
Table 3.3: Provinces in South Africa 
Province Percentage 
Gauteng 22,4% 
KwaZulu-Natal  21,3% 
Northern Cape  2,2% 
Limpopo 10,9% 
Eastern Cape 13,5% 
Free State 5,7% 
North West 6,4% 
Western Cape 10,4% 
Mpumalanga 7,2% 
Source: Statistics South Africa 2010 
3.4.3 The HDI index and economic growth 
In macroeconomic terms, South Africa has developed much since democratization. Between 
1996 and 2000 only, South Africa‟s total exports increased on average by 6.7% per year. 
GDP
19
 in South Africa grew on average by 2.32% per year in the same time period. 
Moreover, the GDP of South Africa grew 1.2% annually in the period 1990-2008 (UN data 
2011). However, the South African economy was also growing before the end of apartheid 
(Levy 1999: 415-420). 
Today South Africa is one of the more prosperous countries in the developing world. South 
Africa has a medium HDI rating, and is ranked as country number 110 in 2010 with a rating 
                                                 
19
 Gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the market value of all final goods and services produced within a 
country in a given period. 
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of 0,597 (UNDP 2011)
20
. This is a low number compared to the developed world, but only 
handful African countries have a higher HDI-ranking. However, in 1990 the HDI-rating of 
South Africa was 0,601 (UNDP 2011). Thus, South African citizens have not experienced an 
increase on their levels on the HDI-scale after democratization. Rather, the level has 
decreased. The HDI-indicators are life expectancy, education and income (UNDP 2011). 
The low HDI-ranking is connected to a low score on the life expectancy indicators. South 
Africa has one of the world‟s highest numbers of people infected with HIV. The annual 
number of deaths rose by 93% between 1997 and 2006 (Avert 2011). In 2006, HIV was 
recorded as a cause of death in 14,783 cases. However, according to researchers from the 
Medical Research Council of South Africa (MRC), this figure is a massive underestimate, 
because the majority of deaths due to HIV are misclassified (Avert 2011). In 2010 the total 
number of people living with HIV is approximately at 5, 24 million.  
In 1990 the life expectancy women was 63.5 years, and the tendency has been that women 
actually have a longer life expectancy than men in South Africa. In two decades this has 
decreased radically, and in 2010 the life expectancy for women was 55, 2 years (Statistics 
South Africa 2010). That women live longer than men is the tendency in many countries, 
despite the fact that more women than men are infected with HIV (Avert 2011). In 2010 10, 
5% of the total population of South Africa was infected by HIV, but in fact 19, 7 % of all 
women were infected (Statistics South Africa 2010).  
Table 3.4: HDI-index in South Africa for the period 1990-2010 for both genders 
 Life expectancy Expected schooling  Schooling, mean GNI/ capita HDI value  
2010  52.0  13.4  8.2  9,812  0.597  
2005  51.8  13.4  7.7  9,020  0.587  
2000  55.8  ..  7.2  7,923  ..  
1995  60.5  13.4  8.2  7,806  0.634  
1990  61.4  11.5  6.5  8,162  0.601  
3.5 Gender inequality in South Africa 
The numbers for gender equality in South Africa are inconclusive. 34 per cent of 
parliamentary seats are held by women, which is impressive compared to many other nations. 
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 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and 
standards of living for countries worldwide. In total 169 countries are included in the HDI index ranking. In 2010 
Norway ranked no. 1 and Zimbabwe ranked no. 169.  
36 
 
66 per cent of adult women have a secondary or higher level of education compared to 68 per 
cent of their male counterparts. Moreover, female participation in the labor market is 51 per 
cent compared to 67 per cent for men.  
3.5.1 Female political empowerment 
Before 1994 the female representation was low in the South African, and black women were 
excluded from politics. In South Africa, white women were allowed to vote in elections from 
the early nineteenth century, while black women could not vote until the end of apartheid. 
Some black men were entitled to vote before 1994, but not all. In 1989 3.5% of the 
parliamentary seats were occupied by women. This number rose radically after 1990 (Eisa 
2011). In 1994, after the first post-apartheid election, the percentage of women in national 
office leapt from 2.4 to more than 26. The percentage increased significantly again, in 
parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004. During the „90s, the ANC-government continued 
with initiatives to improve the status of women, and political quotation was introduced in the 
country (Geisler 2000: 610-616). 
Table 3.5 Number of women in the South African parliament 1994-2009 
Year Total seats Women’s seats % women 
2009 400 172 44,5 
2004 400 131 32,8 
1999 400 120 30 
1994 400 111 25 
Source: IPU 
3.5.2 Female employment rates 
In terms of employment rates, women have been less active than men in South Africa. There 
has been a dramatic increase in the labor force participation of women in South Africa since 
the mid-1990s. The gap has diminished a great deal, and the differences between men and 
women in the 2000s are smaller. In 2001 27, 1% of the women were employed, while the rest 
were either unemployed or not economically active. For men the number of employed was 54, 
4% (Statistics South Africa 2001). In 2007 the division between the genders has changed a 
lot, and more women are participating in the work force.  
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Table 3.6: Employment in South Africa in the period 1990-2007* 
Year 1990 2001 2007 
Sex Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Employer/Self-employed 5,89% 2,33% No data No data 13,56% 12,52% 
Employee 56,53% 33,97% 54,43% 27,13% 83,67% 82,04% 
Unemployed 10,28% 11,97% 23,19% 24,98% No data No data 
Not working 27,29% 51,74% 35,40% 47,9% No data No data 
Unpaid family worker No data No data No data No data  1,65% 3% 
Paid family worker No data No data No data No data 1,1% 2,43% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Statistics South Africa (1990-2007) 
*The numbers are based on a selection of the population.  
3.5.3 Female level of education 
With regards to education, South Africa has performed better than many other developing 
countries. Most South Africans received primary education 20 years ago, and almost all do 
today (Statistics South Africa 1991). However, in 1990, the women were the losers in terms 
of receiving education. Out of the people without any education in 1990, 56, 3% were 
women. In the lower education levels, from grade one up to matric
21
 women are more or less 
equally represented versus the men. The major difference was between the percentages of 
people having a higher education, a bachelor, master or doctor‟s degree, where the majority is 
men (Statistics South Africa 1991).  
More women than men are categorized as having “no schooling” according to the 1996 
census. More men than women have also completed primary school (Statistics South Africa 
1996). However, the amount of men and women that have completed primary, secondary 
school and higher education, is almost the same. Thus, the data shows small differences 
between the education level of South African men and women in 1996. The same tendency is 
present in 2001, where even more women are enrolled in primary and secondary education. 
But at a higher level, the gender equality diminishes, and only 32, 46 % of the ones who took 
a masters or a doctoral degree were women. The data from the 2001 census is based on a 10% 
sample of the population and shows that there is a minimal difference between the genders in 
terms of education (Statistics South Africa 2001). Substantially more women are without any 
schooling. 
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 Equivalent to Videregående skole in Norway. 
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In 2007, the level of education was quite equal between men and women in South Africa. 
This is the case for all education levels. The only major difference is between men and 
women who have completed master‟s or PhD degree, where the percentage is 37, 15 % 
women. Data from recent years show that the differences between the education level 
between men and women are small. In primary and secondary education, the number of 
women and men is more or less the same, and there are actually more women with a 
postgraduate diploma. Out of the total percentage of people in the sample with no schooling at 
all, 58, 8 per cent are women (Statistics South Africa 2007). However, considering that the 
sample includes all generations, this is not surprising, because older women who are alive 
today were less equal when they went to school.  
3.5.4 Gender related violence 
Perhaps one of the most important contradictories to South Africa‟s rise towards gender 
equality is that women are experiencing a great amount of sexual violence in South Africa. 
There is also a relationship between physical abuse and HIV-infection, and as mentioned, the 
women are the ones with the highest infection rate, and this is directly related to sexual 
violence (Kalichman 2010: 681-687). South Africa reportedly has one of the highest rates of 
violence against women in the world, with 53, 008 rapes reported to the police in 2000 and 
123 women reporting rape per 100, 000 population (Kalichman 2010: 682). In comparison, 
the same number in the UK is 16 per 100, 000. In 1998, three out of ten women surveyed in 
the Metropolitan region of Johannesburg reported that they have been victims of sexual 
violence in the previous year (Martin 1998 in Kalichman 2010: 682). There is little doubt that 
the attitudes towards women in South Africa are of a major concern, when faced with the 
numbers of sexually related violence.  
3.6 South Africa and gender inequality today 
This chapter has shown that South Africa has changed largely in short time, also in terms of 
gender equality. However, women still face many obstacles. South Africa is still a country 
where a large percentage of the population is living in traditional societies, where women are 
expected to be in charge of the family. Gender equality is on the rise in South Africa, but 
women are still behind the men and they are experiencing gender related violence to an 
extreme extend. E.g. the GII value for South Africa of 0.635 is “only” ranking it 82 out of 138 
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countries based on 2008 data (UN statistics 2011). South Africa‟s “HDI neighbors”, Namibia 
and Congo, are ranked at 75 and 121 respectively on this index. 
The ending of apartheid has led to major changes in occupational structure, and black South 
Africans have entered new parts of the labor force, including increased female participation. 
South Africa has experienced economic expansion and increased GDP per capita. Also, there 
has been an increasing amount of women in higher education. An economical change such as 
the one undergone in South Africa has led to changes in the labor markets, the end of 
economic sanctions, with new foreign investments and with an increasing economy. In 
addition, the mean years of schooling have gone up, as has the GNI per capita. According to a 
structural explanation, we could expect that the changes in the labor market and in the 
education system should have lead to a change towards more positive gender attitudes.  
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4 Method and Operationalization  
4.1 Introduction 
Statistical analysis within social science must be performed with a clear focus on challenges 
one is likely to meet when handling large amounts of data. The data and the results of the 
analysis also must be evaluated in terms of reliability and validity. I will return to this in the 
methodological discussion later in this chapter.  
In this chapter I will first present the dataset and the research design, and describe the data I 
am using. Further on, I will present the method used, sequential regression analysis. I will 
also briefly explain the effect change design I am using in order to interpret the results of the 
analyses. I will also discuss the methodological challenges, validity and reliability of the 
analysis. Moreover, I will present the operationalization of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables, the socio-structural variables and the three indices measuring 
religious-secular values, left-right materialist values and materialist-postmaterialist values.   
4.2 Dataset and Research design 
The data used in this thesis is existing data from the World Value Surveys. South Africa has 
been included in five waves of the WVS. However, the data from 1982 are very limited, and 
does hardly include any relevant information for this thesis. Therefore, I am using data 
collected in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007. The four surveys are adequate for this thesis, because 
I am mainly interested in the attitude change in the period from the beginning of the 
democratic transition until recent time.  
The World Values survey provides data from almost 80 societies, and grew out of a study 
launched by the European Values Survey group in 1981 (Inglehart 2003:1). The data is 
available for the public, and has been available for me through World Values Surveys online 
data analysis. The questionnaires are not the same in all the four different survey waves, 
something which I must take into account in the analysis. Especially this affects the 
dependent variable, attitudes towards gender equality. It is possible to look at changes over 
time, but I must take into the account that the formulations of the questions have changed, and 
that this can affect the results that I get. 
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In the analysis I will compare the status of South African attitudes towards gender equality at 
four different points of time. The population studied is South African citizens and their 
attitudes towards gender equality and value orientations in the period from 1990 until 2007. 
The selection of individuals is different in every survey, thus I will study the tendency of the 
South African population as a whole.  
The level of analysis is on a micro level, studying the behavior of individuals. The individuals 
are South African citizens living in South Africa in the period 1990-2007 over the age of 16. 
The study will look at a random selection of the South African population, focusing on 
structural and value-based variables. The number of respondents in 1990 was 2736, and the 
number increased slightly and has remained stable between 2935-2988 in the three surveys in 
1996, 2001 and 2007. 
In the 1990 survey the procedure for collecting data was different for white South Africans. 
They received questionnaires to fill in, while the survey was conducted by face to face 
interview by the blacks, coloreds and Asians. In 1996, 2001 and 2007, data from the whole 
sample was collected by face to face interviews (WVS 2009).  
4.3 Method 
In the model for linear regression, some preconditions must be present.  
 The relationship between the variables must be linear. 
 The residual variations are 1) Homoscedastic; 2) Normally distributed; c) Independent 
of each other (not auto-correlated)  
 The independent variable and the residual are not correlating with each other (Skog 
2004: 237).   
In binary regression analysis, the coefficient expresses the expected difference in mean value 
on the dependent variable for units which are one unit of measurement apart on an 
independent variable (Hellevik 1988: 155).  
The method used is regression analysis, where the dependent variable is “attitudes towards 
gender equality”. This is a variable on an ordinal level of measurement, because the 
categories are mutually exclusive, but in ordered in range (Hellevik 2002: 177). When using 
regression analysis as the method, one requirement is that the variables should be on an 
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interval or continuous level of measurement. Ulleberg and Nordvik (2001) states that when 
the variables have many values, it is common to claim that they can be said to be close to an 
interval level of measurement and they can be included in a regression analysis without being 
changed to dummy variables Some people have argued against the use of linear analysis 
claiming that the results are meaningless, but these meanings are disputed. The advantage of 
linear analysis is the intuitive meaningfulness (Hellevik 2007: 59). In this case I find the 
advantages of using linear regression many, and I believe it outweighs the problems caused. 
The dependent variable, “attitudes towards gender equality” is measured on a scale from 0-10 
and is close to being on an interval level of measurement.  
We use regression analysis because we want to describe the relationship between a known 
number of variables. We want to describe the strength and the direction of the relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables. Regression analysis is also a useful tool 
when we wish to explore whether statistical interaction is present, whether the effect of one 
independent variable on the dependent is depending on the effect of other independent 
variables (Skog 2004: 214-215). Regression analysis is used to explain the strength and the 
direction of the connection between the dependent variable and the independent variables. I 
can separate direct and indirect connections between the dependent and the independent 
variables. Moreover I will be able to explore the relative effect of the various explanations 
(Skog 2004: 214). 
I am performing the analysis by doing sequential regression analyses. This means that the 
independent variables are included in the analysis in a prioritized order. This gives more 
detailed information than a simultaneous regression analysis (Christophersen 2009: 149). The 
analysis uncovers how the new variables change the effects of variables already included in 
the model, and how new variables increase the predicted variance (Christophersen 2009: 149).  
4.3.1 The effect change design 
Due to the sequential analysis, the variables are already ordered causally in the analysis, based 
on theoretical assumptions on how they stand in order to each other. In order to interpret the 
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, I am using the effect change 
design.  
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The effect change design we find the various causal components by studying the changes in 
association between two variables, resulting from controlling for other variables (Hellevik 
1988: 70). An indirect effect is found when a component due to an intervening variable X 
between two other variables Y and Z results in a change of the effect of Y on Z (Hellevik 
1988: 77). The total causal effect is defined as the association net of all prior variables in the 
model, while the direct effect is defined as the association remaining after all other variables 
influencing own vote in the complete model have been controlled for (Hellevik 1988: 77). 
When a component of the relationship between two variables is due to prior variables, the 
causal interpretation of this component is a spurious effect (Hellevik 1988: 78). 
By applying the effect change design, I am able to find the indirect effects on attitudes 
towards gender equality, which gives a more complete understanding of how the different 
variables affect the dependent variable.  
4.3.2 Methodological challenges, reliability and validity 
Valid measurement is achieved when scores meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the 
corresponding concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 530). In the next section I will present 
information on the variables I am using in the analysis, capturing the measurement validity. In 
the theoretical discussion in chapter two I discussed the face validity of the dependent 
variable: Attitudes towards gender equality. The data for all four surveys include a large 
amount of units, which strengthens the validity and decreases the possibilities for selection 
errors. Also, it is an advantage to my analysis that the data is collected from the World Values 
Surveys, thus I know that they are of good quality and collected in a professional way.  
Further on, it is an advantage that many questions are asked, thus I have the opportunity to 
create indices which increases the reliability and the validity (Hellevik 2002: 309). When we 
collapse more measurements of the same characteristics about people, we can increase the 
reliability of the data (Hellevik 2002: 309). Since I am interested in studying particularly 
values in relation to attitudes, World Value Surveys is unique in this matter and provides an 
opportunity to study this over time.  
The use of attitudinal variables in statistical research can cause some methodological 
challenges, which is also the case when including values as independent variables. Attitudes 
and values are not something tangible and visible to the eye, such as other qualities held by 
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human beings, for example level of education or religious belief. One of the challenges I face 
when measuring attitudes is they are strongly connected to values. In this study I define how 
they differ from each other by the way they were measured; I.e. the question; “Do you 
approve of women being single mothers?” in stead of; “To what extend to you support gender 
equality?” I agree with Inglehart and Norris (2003) that there must be a relationship between 
values and attitudes, as described in the causal model in chapter two. 
One challenge when using survey data collected over time is that not all information is given 
in all four surveys. One of the challenges I face is the large amount of missing units on some 
of the variables. In some cases this has led to the exclusion of variables, which lowers the 
validity of the results. The data from 1990 has a reliability problem in the sense that the 
collection of data was different for white people and black people. It is likely that people 
being interviewed will give different answers than people filling out questionnaires.  
A disadvantage of using enquetes is that people might not return the questionnaires (Hellevik 
2002: 105). On the other hand, when using interviews, as is done here, one is risking that 
people feel less free to give honest responses, and that the interviewer is the affecting the 
respondent (Hellevik 2002: 105). However, when performing interviews, it can be done in the 
language of the respondent, and in the case of South Africa it can be an advantage because of 
language problems, there are likely to be a large number of people who cannot read English, 
and one could risk that people misunderstood the questions. Thus I believe it strengthens the 
reliability in this case that the surveys have been done with interviewing in the language of 
the respondent, which makes it more likely that everyone has understood the questions. It 
does weaken the reliability in the sense that people might have been less honest when 
answering.  
As described by Hellevik (1995) one measurement problem can be the response set, 
something which might be a problem when the respondents are to say they agree or disagree 
with something. People are often more likely to answer “yes” or “agree”. One advantage with 
the indicators used here is that they are formulated in different ways. Thus, I believe this is 
making in less likely that people have responded more positive. In addition, one indicator 
using the “approve” and “not approve” dichotomy, “Do you approve or disapprove of a 
woman being a single mom?” my results show that people generally disapprove more than 
they approve, something which I will come back to in the analysis. This means that the 
problem of the response set is not likely to be a large problem for the reliability.  
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Moreover, I must take into account that it is difficult to say if the potential changes on the age 
variable in attitudes and value orientation is due to life cycle or cohort effects. It does not say 
if the age groups are different because they have reached different stages of their lives, or if 
they represent cohorts growing up under different circumstances (Hellevik 2002: 286). 
When it comes to the potential of generalization, there is a problem of missing values. In 
some cases I have solved this by giving the missing units the mean value, for example on the 
income variable which has many missing. Where this option has not been available, for 
example on the social class variable, the units have been excluded from the analysis.  
I find it problematic to generalize from the 1990 survey due to missing “colored” respondents. 
As described in chapter three, ethnicity is an important factor in the South African society. In 
addition, I can not generalize too much of the results of being “black”, because with in the 
“black” ethnic group there are a number of different cultural groups. I have decided not to 
include these differences in this analysis, but it is important to know that there are major 
differences within this group. I did not include this because this would have meant a very 
large amount of variables, which I found would complicate the results of the analysis. 
In terms of external validity, the results of this thesis will be difficult to use for generalization. 
Firstly, South Africa is a developing country, and in addition, I believe the special mix of the 
population makes it difficult to apply the results on other counties. I believe one can draw 
some experiences from the results within the different groups over time, and also to look at 
the development of values over time, however only in developing countries with a similar 
cultural background.  
4.4 Operationalization 
4.4.1 Dependent variable: Attitudes towards gender equality 
The World Value Surveys includes a number of questions asked towards perceptions on 
gender equality.  Therefore it is appropriate to include as many as possible to increase the 
validity of the dependent variable: Attitudes towards gender equality. Preferably, more 
questions regarding this matter would be available in the four surveys; however, questions 
regarding gender equality are few in 1990 on one hand, and many in 2007 on the other. This 
confirms the worldwide trend, that the question of gender equality is becoming more 
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important. In the analysis, I will in total use five indicators included in World Value Surveys 
in order to measure gender attitudes by creating two separate indices. The operationalization 
of the two indices is based on the theoretical discussion of gender equality in chapter two.  
Set of indicators 
One thing that complicates the analysis in this thesis is that some of the questions regarding 
attitudes towards gender quality in the surveys are not asked at all four points of time. 
Therefore, I must create two indices, and both indices will include three indicators. One index 
will be used to measure attitudes towards gender equality in the years 1996, 2001 and 2006, 
and the other index will be used for the 1990 data set. The use of two different indices 
measuring the dependent variables complicates the comparison of the 1990 analysis versus 
the analysis for the three other surveys. However, I find this solution preferable to the use of 
an index based on only one or two indicators. I will take this into account when I compare the 
results from the 1990 analysis to the other analyses. 
I have based the operationalization of the dependent variable on the five items index used by 
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris in The Rising Tide. These items are similar to those 
commonly contained in the more comprehensive psychological scales of gender equality, 
tapping attitudes towards politics, the workforce, education and the family (Inglehart and 
Norris 20054: 32).  
Norris and Inglehart examined the reliability and consistency of the five-item Gender Equality 
Scale within different types of societies. The coefficients proved to be slightly stronger in 
post-industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 176). They also found that when 
excluding the two indicators concerning sex roles in the family and child care, the primary 
contrasts between societies remain, showing that gender equality in politics, the paid 
workforce, and education can be regarded as reflecting some of the most basic demands the 
women‟s movement have been fighting for around the world. Many other indicators are 
commonly made in order to promote full equality for women and men, and if data were 
available, a more comprehensive scale could capture these dimensions. The Gender Equality 
scales should not be regarded as reflecting the actual lives of women and men, it rather 
reflects cultural attitudes towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 177).  
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I will not be using an identical five-item scale in my analyses, because some of the indicators 
are missing in some of the South African value surveys. However, the indices I am using are 
based on the same material. Some of the indicators use statements with Lickert-style four-
point agree-disagree responses, while the responses of the other indicators are dichotomies. I 
will recode the indicators so that higher values consistently represent greater support for 
gender equality. The indicator “NEEDKID” is included only in the 1990 analysis, because the 
question is not asked in the 2007 survey, and “BOYEDUC” and “MENPOL” were not given 
in the 1990 survey. 
Index construction: Indicators used in the 1990 analysis  
The relevant indicators measuring attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 1990 
are the following: 
MENJOBS: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”. 
Alternatives for answers are: 1) “Don´t know”, 2) “Agree”, 3) “Neither”, 4) “Disagree”. The 
values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: “Agree” is assigned the value 
0 and “Neither” the value 1 and “Disagree” the value 2.  
SGLMUM: “If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn‟t want to 
have stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?” Alternatives for 
answers are: 1) “Approve”, 2) “Disapprove”, and 3) “Depends” (is not read out, only coded if 
volunteered). The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: 
“Disapprove” is assigned the value 0 and “Depends” the value 1 and “Approve” the value 2.  
NEEDKID: “Do you think a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is 
this not necessary?” Alternatives for answers are: “Needs children” and “Not necessary”. 
The value “Needs children” is assigned the value 0 and “Not necessary” the value 2.  
The indicators have face validity because they all address the question of the women‟s status, 
and also because I know they have been included in other analyses measuring attitudes 
towards gender equality (Norris and Inglehart 2003:32). “MENJOBS” address the question of 
women‟s equal right to work. This is one of the indicators (ii) of gender equality, based on the 
theoretical framework. “SGLMUM” and “NEEDKID” are indicators linked to gender 
equality indicators v and vi: Men and women should have the same family rights and women 
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should have independence. Based on the theoretical background, I believe the three indicators 
are suitable for index construction. I control this by running a factor analysis.  
Factor analysis of the indicators used to measure attitudes towards gender 
equality: 1990 
Table 4.1: Factor Matrix for the dependent variable: 1990 
Factor Matrix*  N=2503 Factor 1   Factor 2 
A woman has to have children to be fulfilled .329 -.235 
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women .425 .090 
Woman as a single parent .115 .338 
* The factor analysis is run with the varimax method and with orthogonal rotation. 
The results of the factor analysis indicate that the three indicators form a factor. The total 
variance explained in factor 1 is 37, 6 %. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test
22
 gives a value 
of less than .50, which indicates that the correlation pattern of the indicators is not the best for 
a factor analysis (Christophersen 2009: 2007).  In addition, the Cronbach's Alfa test of 
reliability is negative, in the sense that the three indicators turn out to have a low degree of 
inner reliability to form an index. However, I choose to use the three indicators because I 
believe they are suitable based on the theoretical discussion of gender equality, and because 
the factor matrix shows that they form a factor. I must also take into account that I do not 
have any really good alternatives in order to measure gender attitudes, and I believe it is better 
to create an index based on more than one indicator of gender equality than to use only one or 
two indicators. In addition, it is preferable to get results from the 1990 data set, than to 
exclude this survey year from the analysis.  
The index is based on the recoding shown above. The index is an equal weighted additive 
index with values from 0 to 10. Units that have missing values on more than one indicator are 
removed from the analysis. 
Index construction: Indicators used in the 1996-2007 analyses 
In 1996, 2001 and 2006 I will measure attitudes towards gender equality using the following 
indicators: 
                                                 
22
 Test to assess the appropriateness of using factor analysis on data. 
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MENJOBS: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”. 
Alternatives for answers are: 1) “Don´t know”, 2) “Agree”, 3) “Neither”, 4) “Disagree”. The 
values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: “Agree” is assigned the value 
0 and “Neither” the value 2 and “Disagree” the value 4. 
MENPOL: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”. 
Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Strongly agree", 2) "Agree", 3) "Disagree", 4) "Strongly 
disagree". The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: “Strongly 
agree” is assigned the value 0, “Agree” the value 1, “Disagree” the value 3 and “Strongly 
disagree” the value 4. 
BOYEDUC: „A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl‟. 
Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Strongly agree", 2) "Agree", 3) "Disagree", 4) "Strongly 
disagree". The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: “Strongly 
agree” is assigned the value 0, “Agree” the value 1, “Disagree” the value 3 and “Strongly 
disagree” the value 4. 
The indicators above all have face validity for the same reasons as for the indicators described 
for the 1990 index construction. “MENJOBS” address the question of women‟s equal right to 
work; “BOYEDUC” address women‟s right to equal education and “MENPOL” address the 
female right to empowerment. Therefore, the three indicators cover three of the main 
indicators of gender equality described in chapter 2; i, ii and iv, thus they form a valid 
theoretical basis for the index construction. 
In the starting point, I wanted to include a fourth indicator in the index construction, 
“SGLMUM”, however a factor analysis showed that this variable has a weak correlation with 
the other indicators in the 2007 data set, thus I will exclude this indicator from the index 
construction. 
Factor analysis of the indicators used to measure attitudes towards gender 
equality: 1996-2007 
A factor analysis for the three relevant indicators is performed in the 1996, 2001 and 2007 
data sets, and gives positive results. Both the KMO test and the factor matrix show that the 
three indicators form a factor.  
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Table 4.2: Factor Matrix for the dependent variable: 1996-2007 
Factor Matrix*: Factor 1  
     1996 2001  2007  
      N=2458 N=2713 N=2786 
BOYEDUC      .317    .540 .494 
MENJOBS .660 .431 .542 
MENPOL .483 .709 .617 
* The factor analysis is run with the varimax method and with orthogonal rotation. 
I have controlled that all three indicators have satisfying levels of skewness and kurtosis and 
therefore are acceptable for a factor analysis to be performed. The KMO test shows that the 
three indictors have a satisfactory degree of bivariate correlations for a factor analysis of the 
indicator set (Christophersen 2009:207). Factor 1 for the three surveys explains totally around 
50% of the variance of the indicator set. Cronbach‟s Alfa test of reliability gives results 
between .471-.553, which indicates medium inner consistency (Christophersen 2009: 219).  
The index is based on the recoding described above. The index will be an equal weighted 
additive index with values from 0-10. Units with missing values on one or zero indicators are 
included in the index, the rest are excluded.  
4.4.2 Independent variables: Socio-structural variables 
Age 
Age is a continuous variable. The youngest age included in the surveys is 16, while the oldest 
person included is 94 years old. A larger percentage of younger people than older have 
answered in the surveys, which is in accordance with the South African population universe.  
Gender 
Except for in 1990, where there are more women than men included in the survey samples, 
the distribution of male and female respondents is quite even in all four surveys. Male will be 
coded low (0) and female will be coded high (1). This is done because I expect women to 
have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than men, and this gives the results of 
the analysis more intuitive meanings. 
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Ethnicity 
South Africa is a diverse society with many different tribal communities, however with four 
“main” racial categories: Black, white, colored and Asian. These are the four categories 
created during apartheid, and they are still used in South Africa (Butler 2009: 33). In the 
World Value Surveys six categories are used, because “Asians” and “coloreds” are divided. 
The former into east and south in the 1990 survey, these two categories will be merged. Also, 
I will merge the two categories “colored (medium)” and “colored (dark)”. None of the 
categories had respondents in 1990 and the last category only had respondents in 2007. I 
believe the distinction between the two categories should not be relevant in this analysis, 
because I am not going in debt with a study of the differences between the ethnicities. 
However, I will split the category “white” into “white English” and “white Afrikaans”. This I 
do because I expect there to be cultural differences between the two “white” groups that might 
affect the results of the analysis. This decision is based on my own assumptions, discussed in 
chapter two.  
In the 1990 survey, the sample was stratified by race over representing minority races (WVS 
2009). The dataset comprise a weighting variable which weight the ethnic groups to their size 
in the South African population. This weighting is consistently used in the analysis below. 
Ethnicity is a categorical variable, thus the variables will be recoded into dummy variables, 
and in the analysis “black” will be used as the reference category.  
Table 4.3: Distribution of ethnic groups when weighted 
 Year survey* 
 1990 1996 2001 2007 
Asian  6.7 3.6 3.5 
Asian: East 11.6** - - - 
Asian: South 2.9 - -  
Black 63.9 55.1 71,4 69.4 
White 21.5  24.8 14.2 17.4 
Colored  13.4 10.7 9.6 
Total  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
*The 1990-2001 datasets are weighed with the enclosed s017 weight. The 2007 dataset is not weighed. 
**Measured in percentage of the population sample 
Urban-rural-dimension 
The urban-rural dimension will be measured by using the indicator x049 “Size of town”. No 
questions regarding this matter were included in the 1990 survey and therefore this variable 
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will only be included in the 1996-2007 survey analyses. The variable used in 1996 has eight 
categories and is different from the one used in 2001 and 2007, where only 6 categories are 
given. From the outset, in the analysis I will be using a 6-category variable and use the same 
labels as were used in the 2001-2007 surveys. This causes the 1996 division to differ slightly 
from the 2001-2007 division, but I presume this not to affect the results of the analysis. Both 
variables tap location on an urban-rural dimension with values from 0 to5. 
Table 4.4: Categories used urban-rural variable 
Category  1996 survey 2001-2007 surveys 
Rural Up to 2000* Up to 499  
Village 2000-5000 
5000-10000 
500-7999  
Small town 10000-20000 
20000-50000 
8000-39999  
Large town 50000-100000 40000-99999  
City 100000-500000 100000-249999  
Metro 5000000 and more 250000 and more  
*Number of inhabitants 
Region 
In 1990 the variable “Region where the interview was conducted” has 78, 5% missing. The 
variable will therefore not be included in the analysis for 1990. Before 1994 South Africa was 
divided into four provinces, and then it was changed into today‟s nine provinces. In the 1996-
2007 surveys, all nine provinces are included. In the analysis, the regional variable will be 
recoded into a set of dummy variables. Since I expect that the inhabitants of the Western 
Cape, KZN and Gauteng to be have more positive attitudes, as discussed in chapter two, the 
choice of reference category will be randomly chosen among the other provinces. I will use 
Northern Province/Limpopo as the reference category. 
Religion 
There are two questions asked regarding religious denomination in the surveys. First, the 
respondents are asked if they belong to a religious denomination, where the answers are “yes” 
or “no”. Then the respondents who have answered “yes” are asked about belonging to 
religious denomination. In the 2007 survey, respondents without denomination are coded 0 
(Medrano 2005:598). Thus the units labeled “missing” in the 2007 survey will be given the 
label “no denomination”.  
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The categories differ in the surveys 1990-2007, and in total 16 different categories are 
presented. Some of the categories have very few respondents, thus some of the categories will 
be merged. The main confessions are however included in all the four surveys.  I will group 
the other categories under broader categories, such as “other Christians” and “The Protestant 
Church”. The variable is categorical and will be recoded into dummy variables, where the 
reference category is “no religious denomination”. The categories are as follows: 
Table 4.5 Religious denomination 
Religious denomination Includes categories 
No religious denomination  
Anglican Church*  
Buddhist  
The Protestant Church Protestant, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Evangelical, TAC** 
Hindu   
African Independent Church  
Other Christians The Orthodox Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Jew Jew, Zionism  
Muslim  
Other   
Roman Catholic   
*Response category is only included in the 1990 survey.  
** TAC=Traditional Anglican Communion; originates in the Protestant tradition. 
Education 
The World Value Surveys use a number of different variables for measuring education level, 
and the variables used are not identical in the four survey years. It is favorable for the results 
of the analysis to use variables with as many values as possible, because this increases the 
validity of the results. I have considered each survey on its own to find the most suitable 
variable for the each analysis. To explore what variables are preferable, I have run a bivariate 
correlation analysis with the different measures of education level.  
In 1990, I will use the variable “highest education level attained”. In the 1996, 2001 and 2007 
surveys I will use the variable “education (country specific)”. A bivariate analysis shows that 
this variable has a high bivariate correlation with the dependent variable. This variable also 
has less missing units than the other educational variables. The categories “technical”, 
“secretarial” and “other” are coded missing. The range is based on the South African 
educational system. I have compared the results with the continuous variable “At what age 
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did you complete your education”, and the results show that the indicator “education (country 
specific)” has a much stronger correlation with the dependent variable.  
Table 4.6: Education level 
 1990 1996 2001 2007 
0 Inadequately completed 
elementary education 
No schooling No schooling No schooling 
1 Completed (compulsory) 
elementary education 
Some primary 
school 
Some primary school Some primary school 
2 Incomplete secondary: 
university-preparatory type 
Primary school 
completed 
Primary school 
completed 
Primary school 
completed 
3 Complete secondary: 
university-preparatory type 
Some high school Some high school Some high school 
4 Some university without 
degree 
Matric Matric Matric 
5 University with degree Some University Artisan´s certificate 
obtained 
Artisan´s certificate 
obtained 
6  University Degree 
completed 
Technikon diploma/ 
degree completed 
Technikon diploma/ 
degree completed 
7  Postgraduate University Degree 
completed 
Some University 
8   Professional University Degree 
completed 
9    Professional 
Income 
Income is a categorical variable on an interval level of measurement. The World Value 
Survey has not been using the same levels of measurement in the four surveys. I will not 
collapse these categories together, because I believe this might lead to loss of information. 
Thus, I will keep the income variable in all four years, and I will keep the respective 
divisions, and recode all of them so that low income is coded 0. In 1990 there are 8 
categories, in 1996 there are 11 and in 2001 there are 19, and in 2007 there are 10 categories. 
The different scales makes the comparison over time more complicated, but it gives a more 
correct analysis of the respective surveys. However, the mean value of income cannot be used 
as an indicator of change over time.  
The income variable has a large amount of missing, which makes the use of the variable less 
attractive, because important information disappears from the analysis when excluding many 
missing units.  Due to the high number of missing, I must control if there is any correlation 
between the dependent variable and the income variable. A correlation analysis indicates that 
the correlation is significant, but weak. In data sets with a large number of units, such as this 
one, even small correlations can be significant (Christophersen 2009: 166). Thus, the missing 
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units on the income variable in 1990, 1996 and 2001 will be given the mean value of the 
income variable scale.  
Social class 
The sociological concept of “social class” can be difficult to operationalize, because there is 
no universal and easy understanding of the definition.  There are different practices, but I have 
chosen to use job/profession as an indicator of the independent variable “social class”. I will 
be using the definition of social class presented in the model of Ericson and Goldthorpe 
(1992). “Social class” has been defined in many different ways in sociological literature. The 
so-called Ericson/Goldthorpe (EG) class schema was originally developed in connection with 
social mobility studies, and is considered to be the most influential conceptualization and 
operationalization of social class in European mobility (Knutsen 2006: 13). 
The aim of the class schema is to differentiate positions within labor markets and production 
units, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations they entail (Ericson 
and Goldthorpe 1992: 37). Their class schema has been delineated with regards to the 
difference between employers having a service relationship with their employers and those 
whose employment relationships are essentially regulated by a labor contract (Ericson and 
Goldthorpe 1992: 42). The class scheme includes 11 social classes in the full version (Ericson 
and Goldthorpe 1992: 38-39).  
The class schema is not constructed around any single hierarchical principle (Ericson and 
Goldthorpe 1992: 44). However, four categories can be presented hierarchically based on the 
relationship between the service class and the working class, and the use of autonomy in the 
working situation: The service class, the routine employees and the skilled and unskilled 
working class. The last class, the farmers, is more distinct and more difficult to place in 
relation to others (Ericson and Goldthorpe 1992: 42-44).  
The categories on which the EG class schema is based are only partially included in the 
response categories given in the WVS surveys for 1990-2007 in South Africa. The variable 
x036 “Profession/Job” has 12 response categories in the 1996-2007 surveys and seven 
response categories in the 1990 survey. The 1990 survey variable has 63, 4 % missing, 
therefore the class variable will not be included in the 1990 analysis. In order to create a 
reliable version of the scheme, I will be using a five category version of the EG class scheme, 
56 
 
with some adjustments of the original version based on the categorization of Knutsen (2006). 
In this data set we both have the case of low cell count in some categories, and some excluded 
categories, and a five-class version is the best option available (Knutsen 2006: 17-19). 
Respondents who have replied that they are “not the chief wage earner in the household” will 
be placed in the categories of the chief wage earner of the household where this information is 
available. Respondents who have replied “never had a job”, “not employed” and “member of 
armed forces” will be coded missing. The variable is on a nominal level of measurement, and 
will be recoded into dummy variables. The categories will be recoded as follows:  
Table 4.7: Social class scheme 
Value Social class WVS 1996, 2001 and 2007: Includes categories  
1 Farmers "Farmer: Has own farm" 
2 Unskilled workers "Semi-skilled manual worker", “Unskilled manual", “Agricultural 
worker" 
3 Skilled manual 
workers  
"Foreman and supervisor", "Skilled manual" 
4 Routine non-
manual employees 
"Non-manual office worker" 
5 Service class "Employer with 10 or more employed", "Employer/manager with 10 or 
less employed", "Professional worker", "Supervisory non manual office 
worker" 
4.4.3 Independent variables: Value-based variables 
I will use three independent variables based on value dimensions in the analysis: The 
economic left-right materialist dimension, the materialist-postmaterialist dimension and the 
religious-secular values dimension.  
Religious-secular values 
The four World Value Survey questionnaires in South Africa do not all include the same 
questions regarding religious-secular values. In 1990-2001 a set of questions regarding beliefs 
are asked. The variables F50-F55: What do you believe in? Where the answers are; 1) God; 2) 
Life after death; 3) That people have a soul; 4) Hell; 5) Heaven and/or; 6) Sin are listed. 
However, these questions are not included in the 2007 survey.  
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A different indicator measuring religious-secular values is included in all four surveys, “How 
important is god in your life?” The answers are rated on a scale from 1 to 10. Religious values 
are coded low for the factor analysis.  
The factor analysis shows that the six questions regarding beliefs are appropriate for index 
construction. The index is created as the mean value of all six indicators, and is given values 
from 1-10.  
To test which indicator for religious-secular is the most appropriate for the analysis, I run a 
bivariate correlation analysis with the dependent variable and the two respective variables: 
The six-item index and the single indicator “How important is God in your life?” The 
correlation analysis shows that the single indicator is a reliable indicator for measuring 
religious-secular values, and when comparing all four surveys this indicator has a stronger 
correlation with the dependent variable than the six-item index. In addition, an advantage in 
using this indicator is that this variable exists in all four surveys years, which makes the 
results easier to compare over time. Thus, I will be using the single indicator “How important 
is god in your life?” to measure religious values in the regression analysis. Below is the 
results of the univariate analysis from the 1990 data, and the results were similar for the other 
three surveys.  
Univariate analysis between the dependent variable and the two variables 
measuring religious-secular values, 1990 survey 
Table 4.8: Univariate analysis, the religious-secular dimension, with attitudes towards gender equality as the 
dependent variable (1990) 
 Attitudes towards gender equality 
Religious-secular values 6-item index .042* 
Religious secular value single item index .153**  
**Correlation is significant in the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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Left-right materialist values 
The indicator set measuring left-right materialist values includes the following indicators: 
Index construction: Indicators included in the left-right dimension 
E035: Income equality: How would you place your views on this scale? The number of 
values is 10. The scale is turned and the values are recoded in the following way for the factor 
analysis: “We need larger income differences as incentives” is assigned the value 1 and 
“Incomes should be made more equal” the value 10.  
E036: Private versus public ownership of business. How would you place your views on 
this scale? The number of values is 10. “Private ownership of business should be increased” 
has the value 1 and “Government ownership of business should be increased” the value 10. 
E037: Government responsibility. How would you place your views on this scale? The 
number of values is 10. “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” 
has the value 1 and “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone 
is provided for” the value 10.  
E041: Wealth accumulation. How would you place your views on this scale? The number 
of values is 10. The scale is turned, and the values are recoded in the following way for the 
factor analysis: “People can only get rich on the expense of others” is assigned the value 1 
and “Wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone” the value 10. The indicator is not 
included in the 2001 survey.  
All indicators have scales from 1-10, and rightist values are coded low.  
The variables have satisfactory levels of skewness and kurtosis. I have performed a factor 
analysis in the aggregate dataset including all four surveys shows that the four indicators are 
suitable for an index construction. KMO is .554. The Cronbach's Alfa test show a result of 
.370, which indicates that the indicator set does not have a very strong inner reliability. 
However, based on theory, the four indicators all measure left-right values in terms of “belief 
in and support for equality, an active government and harmony between the social classes” 
(Bergh 2006:8), thus I find the results adequate for an index construction. Units with more 
than one missing value on the four indicators will be excluded from the analysis.  
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Factor analysis of the indicators for left-right materialist values 1990-2007 
Table 4.9: Factor Matrix left-right values 
Factor Matrix*  N=7857 Factor 1   
Income equality  .401 
Private versus public ownership of business .158 
Government responsibility .783 
Wealth accumulation** .192 
* The factor analysis is run with the varimax method and with orthogonal rotation. 
** This indicator is not included in the 2001 dataset. 
Materialist-postmaterialist values 
I will use the indicator set created by Inglehart, which is already present in the aggregate 
SPSS-file I am using to analyze the data. The 12-item post-materialist index has 6 possible 
results, where 0 equals materialist, and 5 equals‟ postmaterialist values (WVS 2010). The 
existing index will be multiplied by two and given the values 0-10.  
The Materialist-postmaterialist value priorities were measured by asking the survey 
respondents a series of questions which began with “There is a lot of talk these days about 
what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. (…)” Then people are 
presented with goals that they are to give top priority (Inglehart 1997: 108). In total 12 goals 
were presented, and among these six goals were intended to emphasize survival needs, and 
were designed to tap “materialist” values. The rest were to tap postmaterialist values 
(Inglehart 1997: 108). The materialist-postmaterialist items were presented as three batteries 
where respondents were to rank the first and the second most important political value 
(Knutsen 1995: 55). I will not perform a factor analysis on these indicators, because I 
presume that the factor analysis performed by Inglehart (1997) is sufficient in order to use the 
materialist-postmaterialist value dimension in this analysis. The goals presented were:                                                                                                                                                                  
List over materialist/post-materialist goals 
 Maintaining a high level of economic growth. 
 Making sure this country has strong defense forces. 
 Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in 
their communities. 
 Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
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 Maintaining order in the nation. 
 Giving people more say in important government decisions. 
 Fighting rising prices. 
 Protecting freedom of speech. 
 A stable economy. 
 Progress towards a less imperial and more humane society. 
 Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money. 
 The fight against crime  
4.5 Overview all variables: Means and standard 
deviation 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 give a complete overview over all variables included in the four 
sequential analyses. I have presented the mean values of the variables on an interval or 
continuous level of measurement. However, some of the variables, such as income and 
education, do not have the same scales. Thus, their mean values can not be compared over 
time.  
I also present an overview over the frequencies of the categorical variables. I am presenting 
this in frequencies rather than percentage, because I find that this is useful information in 
order to understand some of the results in the analyses. By this I refer to the fact that some of 
the categories have very low number of respondents, such as the religious denomination 
“Buddhist”.  
Table 4.10: Mean values and standard deviations 
Independent 
variables 
Values Mean Standard deviation 
Year Survey  1990 1996 2001 2007 1990 1996 2001 2007 
Age Continuous 36.50 37.66 35.60 38.82 14.745 13.347 13.903 16.583 
Gender M=0, F=1 .519 .524 .50 .50 .500 .500 .500 .500 
Education Interval 1.963 2.464 4.38 3.457 1.442 1.540 1.612 1.922 
Income Interval 4.18 1.669 5.19 3.838 2.113 2.243 4.214 2.377 
Urban-Rural Interval - 2.241 3.874 3.629 - 2.167 1.813 1.964 
Religious-secular  Index 1-10 1.96 1.906 1.912 1.839 2.028 1.743 1.750 1.537 
Left-right Index 1-10 6.003 5.655 5.798 5.345 2.014 1.900 1.984 1.678 
MPM Index 1-10 4.189 3.295 3.467 3.448 2.239 2.114 3.467 2.074 
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Table 4.11: Frequencies: Categorical variables  
 Number of units  Number of units 
Variable 1990 1996 2001 2007 Variable 1996 2001 2007 
Ethnic group Region 
Asian 397 75 108 106 Limpopo  300 137 165 
Black 1749 2151 2143 2073 KwaZulu-Natal  609 458 570 
Colored - 245 322 288 Gauteng 631 1429 886 
White 590 - - - Mpumalanga 199 64 139 
White Afrikaans - 276 254 299 Eastern Cape 409 201 400 
White English - 187 172 222 Northern Cape 37 52 50 
IN TOTAL  2736 2934 2999 2988 Western Cape 309 321 371 
Religious denomination     Free State 210 157 203 
No religious denomination 242 310 402 503 North West 231 182 204 
Other  - - 99 168 IN TOTAL 2935 3000 2988 
Muslim  349 33 84 54 Social class    
Hindu 113 47 54 54 Farmer 41 7 17 
Jew  - 290 7 - Unskilled 
Workers 
1643 479 1245 
African Independent 
Church 
- - 435 396 Skilled Workers 326 592 450 
Protestant 1491 1631 1469 1376 Routine Emp.  153 270 262 
Catholic  280 385 337 364 Service class 521 123 643 
Other Christians - 58 6 60 IN TOTAL 2684 2855 2617 
Buddhist - 3 1 8     
Anglican 261 - - -     
IN TOTAL 2736 2757 2894 2988     
 
The mean values over time show that the selection of population included in the four surveys 
is fairly stable. The mean age is slightly higher in 2007, thus more older people have 
responded. The division of the two genders is also very stable. The income variable can not be 
compared over time. However, the three value dimensions can be compared. The results are 
somewhat interesting, because it appears that people have less postmaterialist values, less 
secular values and less leftist values in 2007 compared to 1990. This is the exact opposite 
result of what I was expecting to find. The regression analyses will provide more information 
about these tendencies. Moreover, there are few Asians included in 1996, also when the data 
set is weighted. There are an overweight of Muslims and Hindus in 1990 compared to the 
other three years. In addition, the distribution of Jews is very uneven. 
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5 Analysis 1: How have attitudes 
towards gender equality changed over 
time?  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I am going to look at the development on attitudes towards women in South 
Africa from 1990 to 2007, to examine what changes have occurred in this time period.  
As described in chapter two, according to Inglehart and Norris (2003), South Africa is still a 
country under development and a traditional society. Because of this, South African citizens 
are unlikely to have gone through a culture and value change to a large extent, and 
postmodern values such as self-expression values, might not be strongly present in society. 
Nevertheless, even if the South Africans have not experienced a shift towards more 
postmodern values, they have experienced structural, political and economical changes. 
Gender equality has been brought to the political agenda. As described in chapter two, I 
expect these changes to have led to a change towards more positive attitudes towards gender 
equality over time, and that a period of seventeen years has transformed society to such a 
degree that both men and women of all ages now are more positive towards a society where 
women and men are equal. Since the end of apartheid there has been an allocation of work, 
and more women are employed in different sectors, this might have led to an attitude change, 
pointing to the structural explanations described in chapter two.  
To examine this research question I look at the mean values of the index measuring attitudes 
towards gender equality over time, and compare the results from the four different points of 
time. To support the findings I also look at the mean value of some of the single indicators 
measuring attitudes towards gender equality. Further on I will study the bivariate correlations 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables by looking at their Pearson‟s R 
values and the results from bivariate regression analyses with the categorical variables. 
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5.2 Mean values: Attitudes towards gender equality 
Firstly, before I take a look at the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
different explanation variables over time, I will present the mean value of the dependent 
variable of in the four survey years. This shows us the support for gender equality in South 
Africa by the index construction described in chapter four.   
Table 5.1: Mean values: Attitudes towards gender equality 
Attitudes towards gender equality index: 1990 1996 2001 2007 
N N=2690 N=2882 N=2986 N=2957 
Mean value (on scale 0-10) 3.266 5.974 6.445 6.057 
 
The mean value shows what the average respondent of the survey populations have responded 
to the questions regarding gender equality used in the indices. The mean values are similar in 
1996-2007, with 2001 having the highest mean score, but the mean value in the 1990 survey 
is much smaller. I suspect this to be a result of the 1990 index being constructed by a different 
set of indicators than the three other survey years. It could be that the three indicators used in 
the 1990 index construction are measuring a different set of attitudes towards gender equality, 
since some of the questions are directed at other indicators measuring gender equality.  
To examine if this is the case, I look at the mean value of two indicators of attitudes towards 
gender equality that asked in all four survey years: 1) “If jobs are scarce, are men more 
entitled to a job than a woman?” (MENJOBS); and: “Do you approve with a woman being a 
single mom?” (SGLMUM).  
Table 5.2: Mean values: "Men Jobs" and "Single Mum" 
Mean value (Scale 0-4) 1990 1996 2001 2007 
N N=2736 N=2878 N=2923 N=2963 
Mean value: MENJOBS 1.497 2.246 2.49 2.274 
N N=2634 N=2824 N=2901 N=2986 
Mean value: SGLMUM  1.205 1.259 1.72 1.509 
 
The mean values of the two single indicators confirms that there is a larger difference between 
the results from 1990 and the three other survey years, thus the two indices are both 
measuring the same attitudes towards gender equality. The mean value of the indicator 
“MENJOBS” is significantly smaller in 1990, as is the mean value of the indicator 
“SINGLEMUM”. This confirms that the attitudes towards gender equality were less positive 
in South Africa in 1990 than in the years 1996-2007.  
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Another interesting tendency is also here confirmed: The attitudes towards gender equality are 
becoming more positive over time if one looks at the time period from 1990 to 2001, but there 
is a decline in the mean values for 2007, both for the index alone and for the single indicators.  
The mean value changes with 2.708 points from 1990 to 1996, and considering that this is a 
10-point scale and a large number of units are included (2690-2957) this is a major change in 
four years time. In other words, the South African citizens became much more positive 
towards gender equality in the short time period from 1990 to 1994. The South Africans 
continued to develop more positive attitudes on to 2001, but then the development stopped, 
and the average attitudes towards gender equality returned to the same approximate level as in 
1996.  
According to hypothesis 1, the citizens of South Africa should have become more positive 
towards gender equality over time. Since the mean value is an indicator of this potential 
change, then the hypothesis is unconfirmed. South Africans have not become steadily more 
positive towards gender equality in this time period, except for the change from 1990 to 1994.   
5.3 Bivariate correlations: Pearson’s R 
In order to find the answer to how attitudes towards gender equality have changed over time 
in South Africa, it is useful to look at the bivariate correlations between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable.  
The mean value of the dependent variable over time has already showed that the population of 
South Africa has not moved towards more positive gender equality attitudes in the time period 
studied here. In addition to simply looking at the value of the dependent variable over time, I 
also want to study how the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables has developed over time. In chapter six I will perform regression analyses for all 
respective survey years, which will explain how the variables interact in all four models. That 
will give more detailed information on the relationships between the different variables. In 
this section, I will examine the independent variables independently of each other.  
Pearson‟s R is a measure of the correlation between two variables X and Y, and produces a 
value between 1 and -1. Pearson‟s R is used to measure the strength of the linear dependence 
between two variables. The Pearson‟s correlation coefficient between two variables is defined 
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as the covariance of the two variables divided by the product of their standard deviations 
(Christophersen 2009: 49). The correlation measures linear relationships, thus Pearson‟s R 
correlation between the dependent variable and the independent variables on a continuous or 
an interval level of measurement is presented here.  
Table 5.3: Bivariate correlations: Pearson‟s R 
Independent variables  Attitudes towards Gender Equality Index 
  1990 1996 2001 2007 
Age Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.151 
.000 
2689 
-.127 
.000 
2877 
-.119 
.000 
2934 
-.046 
.013 
2956 
Gender Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.047 
.015 
2690 
.164 
.000 
2882 
.300 
.000 
2934 
.277 
.000 
2957 
Urban-Rural Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
 .078 
.000 
2882 
.167 
.000 
2934 
.074 
.000 
2957 
Education Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.228 
.000 
2 
.184 
.000 
2744 
.263 
.000 
2871 
.170 
.000 
2898 
Income Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.206 
.000 
2690 
.063 
.001 
2882 
.143 
.000 
2934 
.048 
.011 
2813 
Materialist-post-materialist values Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.076 
.000 
2538 
-.014 
.450 
2882 
-.034 
.069 
2811 
-.035 
.061 
2809 
Left-right values Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
-.135 
.000 
2682 
-.095 
.000 
2851 
-.124 
.000 
2925 
-.033 
.075 
2937 
Religious-secular values Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.153 
.000 
2665 
-.012 
.516 
2848 
-.144 
.000 
2884 
-.067 
.000 
2942 
 
The results of the bivariate correlation analysis produce some predictions on the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables over time. The overall tendency 
in this correlation analysis is that there are few bivariate relationships that are linear over time 
to be found. In other words: In the time from 1990 to 2007, attitudes towards gender equality 
were not changing or developing in a specific pattern, based on the independent variables here 
included.  
One exception is age. The bivariate effect of age on attitudes towards gender equality is 
clearly decreasing over time, if one look at the Pearson‟s correlation. In 2007 people of 
different ages have the same opinions about gender equality to a larger extent than in 1990, 
where there is a much stronger strong bivariate correlation between age and gender attitudes. 
The effect of gender is developing in the complete opposite direction of age; it is increasing 
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over time and stabilizing in 2001-2007. In 1990, the bivariate correlation for gender is not 
very strong, but in 2001 and 2007, Pearson‟s R is clearly stronger. The difference between 
men and women when it comes to gender attitudes increases over time.  
Education is one of few variables where the results over time are fairly consistent, and the 
correlation between level of education and attitudes towards gender equality is strong. This 
shows that level of education clearly has a bivariate effect on gender attitudes. However, 
when comparing the results of the bivariate correlations for all the four survey years, the 
Pearson‟s R coefficient is at the weakest in 2007, which might mean that the effect of 
education on attitudes towards gender equality is becoming less important. On the other hand, 
the coefficient is stronger in 2001 than in 1996, which indicates the opposite tendency. The 
variations in the education variable thus might be due to random differences.  
The bivariate correlations between the urban-rural variable and the dependent variable are 
also significant in all three survey years where the variable is included. The effect is not very 
strong in 1996 and 2007, but it is quite strong in 2001. Also here, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions, because the pattern is inconsistent. If we have a look at the mean values of this 
variable presented in chapter four, and compare the three survey years, the distribution of 
respondents on this variable was not atypical in 2001, thus the distribution of the respondents 
can not be the reason for 2001 having a stronger bivariate correlation.  
When it comes to income the pattern is also not easy to interpret. In 1990 the bivariate 
relationship between income and gender attitudes is negative and fairy strong. This means that 
there is a connection between having low levels of income and positive attitudes towards 
gender equality. This is the opposite results of what I expected in my hypothesis on the effect 
of income. The correlation with income is weak in 1996 and stronger in 2001: but now the 
effect is positive. Thus, people with higher income are more likely to have answered 
positively towards gender equality in the surveys. In 2007 the effect is weaker than any of the 
foregoing years. This indicates that income means less for the matter of gender attitudes in 
2007 than in the years before, and that there is not a consistent relationship between income 
and gender attitudes when comparing this over time. 
Out of the three value dimensions, the left-right index is the value index which has the 
strongest and most consistent correlation with attitudes towards gender equality. The 
Pearson‟s R value is significant in 1990-2001, but the relationship over time is not linear and 
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stronger in 1990 and 2001 than in 1996, and not significant in 2007. The results show that it 
was a correct decision to include this value dimension in the analysis, because there is a 
relationship between left-right materialist values and attitudes towards gender equality. The 
value dimension provides gives results than the other two value dimensions, and adds 
information to the results of the analysis. The coefficient is negative in all four survey years, 
indicating that actually people holding more rightist values are more positive towards gender 
equality. Also here these results are the opposite of my hypothesis. This is something I will 
come back to in chapter six, after having running the regression analysis and controlling for 
the effects of other variables.  
The results from the bivariate analysis of the materialist-postmaterialist dimension are also 
differing from the results that I was expecting. As I described in chapter two, the value 
dimension is constructed so as to measure the differences between materialist and 
postmaterialist values. The latter are likely to be held by many people living in highly 
developed postmodern societies, and I am not expecting that many South Africans are holding 
postmaterialist values. However, in 1990 there is a significant correlation indicating that 
people holding more postmaterialist values are more positive towards gender equality. The 
results of the three other survey years are insignificant, indicating that there are no significant 
differences between people holding materialist values and postmaterialist values with regards 
to gender attitudes. This is interesting because it appears that more people were 
postmaterialists in 1990 than in 2007, which are the opposite results of what I was expecting.  
The religious-secular dimension has a significant Pearson‟s R coefficient in all years except 
for in 1996. The correlation is the strongest in 1990, and it is weaker in 2007 than in 2001. 
The coefficient is also negative for the two latter survey years, indicating that people holding 
more religious values are actually more positive towards gender equality, opposite of what I 
expected to find in the relationship between gender attitudes and religious-secular values.  
The results of the bivariate analyses including the three value dimensions show that none of 
the three are giving the results I expected. The results I was expecting is based on the results 
found when measuring these values and gender attitudes in industrialized countries, as I 
discussed in chapter two. The bivariate analysis show that the value-based explanation model 
is not suitable for South Africa is this time period.  
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5.4 Bivariate correlations: Linear regression 
analyses 
In this section I am executing bivariate analyses with the dependent variable and the four 
categorical variables included in the analysis; Ethnicity, region, religion and social class. 
Bivariate regression analyses (OLS
23
) with the independent variables described in the last 
section give the same results as in the Pearson‟s R analyses.  
Table 5.4: Ethnicity: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent 
variable. 
   Year survey     
N N=2690  N=2882 N=2934  N=2957  
Ethnicity 1990  1996  2001  2007  
Coefficients B Beta B Beta B Beta B Beta 
White .847 .137**       
White Afrikaans   -.420 -.044* -.286 -.029 .092 .010 
White English    1.156 .101** .614 .051** .900 .086** 
Asian -.675 -.094** .095 .005 -.042 -.003 .298 .020 
Colored   -.948 -.094** -.059 -.007 .187 .020 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The results of the bivariate analyses show that in 1990, white people are more positive than 
Asians, compared to the black. In 1996, there are no significant differences between the 
Asians and the black, but the white Afrikaans and the coloreds are more negative than the 
black. The white English however, are more positive towards gender equality. In 2001 and 
2007 there is also a significant and positive difference between white English and black, but 
this effect is weaker than in 1996. There are no significant differences between black, white 
Afrikaners, coloreds and Asians in 2001 and 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 OLS: The ordinary least squares method.  
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Table 5.5: Religious denomination: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the 
dependent variable. 
  Year survey   
N N=2690 N=2710 N=2830 N=2952 
Religious denomination 1990 1996 2001 2007 
Coefficients B Beta B Beta B Beta B Beta 
Anglican .020 .002       
Buddhist   .972 .012 .655 .005 2.080 .039* 
Protestant -.302 -.059 .257 .045 .430 .077** .449 .081 
Hindu -.783 -.062** -.060 -.003 .265 .013 .441 .021** 
Independent African Church     .130 .017 .144 .018 
Other Christians   .669 .035 .315 .005 -.080 -.004 
Jew   .195 .021 -.763 -.014   
Muslim -.572 -.075** .187 .007 .039 .002 .633 .031 
Other     .184 .012 .184 .015 
Roman Catholic -.049 -.006 .339 .042 .385 .044 .503 .059** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
In 1990 both the Hindus and the Muslims were more negative towards gender equality than 
the people who did not belong to any religious denomination. In 1996 there were no 
significant differences between the “no denomination” category and any of the religious 
belongings. In 2001 being protestant had a positive effect on attitudes towards gender equality 
versus the ones who had no religious denomination, and in 2007 being Hindu and Roman 
Catholic had a positive effect on gender attitudes. None of the religious denominations had a 
positive effect in all four years versus the ones who are not religious.  
Table 5.6: Region: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent 
variable. 
  Year survey    
N N=2882 N=2934  N=2957  
 Region 1996 2001 2007 
 Coefficients B Beta B Beta B Beta 
KwaZulu-Natal .891 .129** .572 .074* 1.262 .180** 
Gauteng .330 .048 1.502 .267** .874 .144** 
Mpumalanga -.656 -.058* 1.138 .059** .413 .031 
Eastern Cape -.530 -.065* -.132 -.012 .464 .057 
Northern Cape -.529 -.021 -.785 -.036 -.494 -.023 
Western Cape -.496 -.054* .783 .087** .598 .072* 
Free State .229 .021 .153 .012 -.021 -.002 
North West -.593 -.057* -.180 -.015 .731 .067* 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
When it comes to region, there are few results to be found in the bivariate analyses. However, 
the inhabitants of KZN has, as stated also predicted in the hypotheses in chapter two, more 
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positive attitudes towards gender equality than the people living in Limpopo, in all three years 
when it is measured. Also, the citizens of Gauteng have more positive attitudes in 2001 and 
2007. The same is the case for the Western Cape. However, the effect is the opposite in 1996 
for the inhabitants of the Western Cape. The effect of living in the North West is also 
inconclusive: Negative in 1996 and positive in 2007. The same is the case for the effect of 
being an inhabitant of Mpumalanga. Thus, it does not look like the effect of region variable is 
stable, and the variation in the results might be due to variations in the population selected in 
the four surveys, rather than lasting differences between the regions. However, in 2007, as 
assumed, the citizens if KZN, Gauteng and the Western Cape are more positive towards 
gender equality versus the citizens of Limpopo.  
Table 5.7: Social class: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent 
variable. 
  Year survey  
 N N=2634 N=2791 N=2692 
 Social class 1996 2001 2007 
 Coefficients B Beta B Beta B Beta 
Farmer -.969 -.042* .283 .005 .148 .004 
Skilled Manual -.284 -.033 .674 .097** .142 .019 
Routine Manual .220 .018 .853 .089** 1.069 .114** 
Service Class .589 .083** 1.014 .143** 1.038 .159** 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
When it comes to social class, the results of the bivariate regression analyses partially confirm 
the hypothesis regarding social class. The service class has more positive attitudes in all three 
survey years compared to unskilled manual workers. In 1996 the farmers are more negative 
than the unskilled manual workers, but there are no differences between the two groups in 
2001 and 2007. The only significant differences between the unskilled manual and the skilled 
manual are found in 2001 where the latter group is more positive. The routine manuals are not 
more positive in 1996, but in 2001-2007 also the routine manual workers have more positive 
attitudes towards gender equality than the unskilled manual workers, confirming the 
hypothesis.  
5.5 Main findings 
The results from the study of the mean values of the dependent variable and the bivariate 
analyses have provided several predictions on the status of attitudes towards gender equality 
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in South Africa in the time period studied. Overall, attitudes towards gender equality became 
slightly more positive comparing the levels of the early nineties with the results from the 21st 
century. However, when we have a look at both the mean value of the index of the four 
surveys and also the mean value of the two single indicators, it looks like attitudes towards 
gender equality actually have become slightly less positive in the years between 2001 and 
2007 in South Africa.  
The bivariate correlations with the independent variables show some of the same tendencies. 
All the non-categorical independent variables have a stronger Pearson‟s R with the dependent 
variable in 2001 than in 2007, except for the materialist-postmaterialist dimension, which is 
non-significant. This indicates that the question of gender equality has become less important 
in society in general. The societal differences are decreasing with regards to attitudes on 
gender equality: which again might mean that society is becoming less fragmented in terms of 
socio-structural factors.  
Thus the hypothesis, H1: In South Africa, there has been a positive shift in values towards 
gender equality since the democratic transition, and South Africans have become steadily 
more positive towards gender equality since the democratic transition, can not be confirmed. 
South Africans have not become steadily more positive towards gender equality in this time 
period, except for the change from 1990 to 1994 
The bivariate correlation analysis indicates that the socio-structural variables have the 
strongest effect on attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa. The correlation of 
gender with gender attitudes increases over time, while the correlation effect of age decreases 
over time. The correlation with income and education is also decreasing over time, however 
education hold a fairly stable correlation effect on attitudes towards gender equality according 
to the bivariate analysis results.  
The results of the bivariate correlation matrix for the materialist-postmaterialist value 
dimension show that this value dimension is not a good indicator for measuring attitudes 
towards gender equality in this time period. The Pearson‟s R for religious-secular values show 
that they do matter in affecting gender attitudes, but people that are more religious are more 
positive in the latest years. 1990 is the only survey year showing the results I expected: 
People that hold more religious values are clearly more negative. The effect of left-right 
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values is also decreasing over time, and is giving the opposite results: Leftist values are not 
leading to more gender equality positive attitudes in South Africa.  
The results of the bivariate analyses clearly show that structural explanations are better than 
value-based explanations when it comes to explain attitudes towards gender equality in South 
Africa.  
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6 Analysis 2: What can explain 
variations in attitudes towards gender 
equality in South Africa? 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will address the second research question of the thesis, the question of what 
can explain variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa from 1990 to 2007. 
In chapter five, I have already established some tendencies that can be found in the data from 
South Africa in this period, and the results from the bivariate analyses indicated the structural 
explanations are more suitable than the value-based explanations.  
However, it is necessary to perform a more complex regression analysis to understand how 
the different variables affect each other, and test the hypotheses that I presented in chapter 
two. In order to test the hypotheses regarding the effects of socio-structural variables and 
value-based variables I will perform sequential regression analyses for all four survey years. 
Further on, I will apply the effect change design to study the effects on attitudes towards 
gender equality. In all four survey years, I will examine if the hypotheses can be confirmed 
based on the results from the sequential analyses.   
The analysis is organized as a regression analysis performed in sequences. The first step only 
includes the ascribed variables, which are gender, age and ethnicity. The second step of the 
analysis includes semi-ascribed variables, which are religious confession, region and the 
urban-rural dimension. In the third step of the sequential analysis achieved variables are 
introduced, including level of education, income level and social class. The fourth step 
includes all the independent variables, also the three value-based variables: The religious-
secular value dimension, the materialist-postmaterialist value dimension and the left-right 
materialist value dimension.  
Test of statistical interaction 
One of the advantages with regression analysis is the opportunity to test for statistical 
interaction. I suspect that there to be statistical interaction between education level and gender 
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and between age and gender with the effect on attitudes towards gender equality. Thus, I 
expect younger women to be more positive towards gender equality than older women and I 
expect women with higher levels of education to be more positive than women of lower 
education to be more positive towards gender equality. I test these predictions by creating 
variables for the interaction between education and gender and between gender and age, and I 
include these variables in a multivariate regression analysis, with all variables included.  
In the 1990 and the 1996 multivariate analyses the two variables measuring statistical 
interaction show no significant effects, thus I will not include them in the sequential 
regression analysis. In 2001 the interaction between gender and age is significant, thus this is 
included in the sequential regression analysis. In 2007 both interaction effects are significant 
and are included in the sequential analysis. 
6.2 The 1990 survey data: Analysis and discussion 
Table 6.1: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable 
(1990). N: 2507 
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
 B  Beta B  Beta B Beta B Beta 
Ascribed variables         
Age -.029 -.168** -.029 -.166** -.023 -.132** -.021 -.123** 
Gender .239 .047** .262 .052** .322 .064** .344 .068** 
Ethnicity
24
         
Asian -.571 -.078** -.628 -.086** -.977 -.134** -.892 -.122** 
White 1.013 .162** 1.009 .162** -.189 -.030 -.239 -.038 
Semi-ascribed variables         
Religious confession
25
         
Anglican   -.006 -.001 -.140 -.016 .123 .014 
Protestant   -.351 -.069 -.431 -.085** -.075 -.015 
Hindu   -.089 -.007 -.263 -.020 .045 .003 
Muslim   -.492 -.065* -.609 -.080** -.325 -.043 
Roman Catholic   .016 .002 -.187 -.022 .113 .014 
Achieved variables         
Education     .186 .105** .157 .089** 
Income     -.206 -.170** -.195 -.162** 
Value-based variables         
Postmaterialist index       .063 .055** 
Left-right materialist values       -.064 -.050* 
Religious-secular       .136 .108** 
R2 .063 .068 .097 .112 
Adjusted R2 .061 .064 .093 .107 
Adjusted R2 change  .003 .029 .014 
                                                 
24
 “Black” is the reference category.    **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
25
 “No religious denomination” is the reference category. ). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.1 presents the results from the sequential regression analysis performed on the survey 
data from 1990. R² is not strong in any of the four steps of the analysis
26
. This indicates that 
the included variables in this analysis are not sufficient for fully explaining variations in 
gender attitudes in South Africa in 1990. The very small increase in R² when including 
religious confession in step 2 is not significant, which means that religious confession, does 
not significantly affect gender attitudes. R² does increase significantly from step 1 to step 3, 
so the explanation variables income and education clearly do have an effect on gender 
attitudes in this analysis. In step four the value-based variables are included in the analysis. 
This leads to a significant increase of R² of .014 from step 3. The three value dimensions do 
not include much explanation to the model compared to the ascribed and the achieved socio-
structural variables, but they add a small amount of information to the analysis in 1990. 
Several of the independent variables are not significant on the 0.05 level, so we cannot 
conclude that they have any significant effects on gender attitudes. However, some of the 
hypothesis can be tested at this stage. I will comment on the standardized beta-coefficients in 
order to describe the effects of the independent variables that are on an interval- or a 
continuous level of measurement. I will be commenting on the non-standardized regression 
coefficient B in the cases where categorical variables are recoded into dummy variables.  
Hypothesis 2, Younger people are more likely to have positive attitudes than older people, is 
confirmed. The results of the 1990 analysis show that younger people are more likely to be 
positive towards gender equality than older people. The total causal effect is significant and 
stronger than the effect of gender. The effect of age does not change much when religious 
confession is included in the analysis, but the effect decreases with the inclusion of achieved 
variables and even more when value-based variables are included in the regression analysis. 
The explanation for this might be that younger people have higher education and higher 
income than older people, which results in a change in effect of age. The indirect effect of age 
is 4, 5 %, thus some of the causal effect of age on gender attitudes is a result of differences in 
other socio-structural factors between age groups and also differences in the values of 
younger and older people. 
When it comes to hypothesis 3, women are more likely to have positive attitudes than men; 
this is fully confirmed in the analysis of the 1990 dataset. The total causal effect of gender 
                                                 
26
 The value of R
2 
indicates the amount of predicted variance (Christophersen 2009: 141).  
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(.047) is significant, and the standardized beta-coefficient in the first and the second step of 
the regression analysis is significant. However, the effect of gender on gender attitudes is 
weak. When education and income is controlled for, gender has a slightly stronger significant 
effect, .064, on attitudes towards gender equality. Thus, when comparing the attitudes of men 
and women, female attitudes towards gender equality become slightly more positive when 
education and income is controlled for. This means that the attitudinal gender gap is small 
from the outset, but the differences increase with religious belonging and with differences in 
income- and educational levels. The direct effect of gender almost does not change with the 
inclusion of value-based variables. 
The hypothesis regarding ethnicity, which state that white South Africans are likely to be 
more positive than black, coloreds and Asian, and black South Africans are likely to be the 
ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality, is not confirmed. The 
results of the analysis show that Asians are more negative towards gender equality than black 
people in South Africa in 1990. The causal effect of white ethnicity is significant and positive, 
however it turns out that the positive effect of white ethnicity is an indirect effect: the direct 
effect of white ethnicity is not significant. White people do have more positive attitudes 
towards gender equality than black people, but this can be explained by other variables, since 
the coefficient is not significant in step 3 and step 4 of the analysis. 
The effects of ethnicity changes radically with the inclusion of income level and education 
level in the model, and the effect of being white is no longer significant when education and 
income is controlled for in step 3. The direct causal effect of Asian ethnicity in step 3 is 
almost the double of the step 1 effect, which indicates that the negative effect of Asian 
ethnicity compared to black ethnicity is strengthened by income and education level. The 
direct effect of the Asian ethnicity variable is strong and significant.  
When it comes to the hypothesis 7, stating that people that do not belong to any religious 
denomination are more positive towards gender equality than people belonging to a religious 
denomination, this is not confirmed. None of the direct effects are significantly strong in order 
to confirm the hypothesis. However, the results indicate that there is a difference between 
people with no religious belonging and the other groups, because almost all the regression 
coefficients have negative preceding signs, indicating that belonging to a religious 
denomination leads to less positive gender attitudes. The direct causal effects of being Muslim 
and Protestant is significant and strong in step 3, however the effects are no longer significant 
77 
 
in step 4. This indicates that values explain the differences between non-religious people and 
religious people in South Africa in 1990.  
Hypothesis 8 states that people with higher levels of education are likely to have more 
positive attitudes than people with lower levels of education. This hypothesis is confirmed for 
the 1990 data set, and the beta-coefficients are significantly strong. The direct effect of 
education is somewhat weaker than the causal effect, thus there exists a small indirect effect 
via the value dimensions.  
Hypothesis 9, People with higher levels of income are likely to be more positive towards 
gender equality than people with lower levels of income, is not confirmed. In the data from 
1990, the results show the complete opposite tendency. The total causal effect of income is -
.170 which means that when income increases, attitudes towards gender equality become less 
positive. The direct effect of income is also significant; however a small portion of the effect 
of income is an indirect effect via values.  
When it comes to the hypotheses regarding values, H11, People with post-materialist values 
are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with materialist values, 
this is confirmed. The total causal effect and the direct effect of postmaterialist values on 
attitudes towards gender equality is .055. The effect is not very strong, but indicates that there 
is a relationship between the two, and that more postmaterialist values leads to more positive 
gender attitudes. 
The religious-secular dimension provides the strongest direct and significant effect out of the 
three value dimensions. There is a positive and significant relationship between the religious-
secular dimension and attitudes towards gender equality, thus hypothesis 12 is confirmed. 
People with secular values are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality 
than people with religious values. 
The hypothesis regarding the left-right value dimension, People with left materialist values 
are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with right materialist 
values, is not confirmed for 1990. The results shows the unexpected opposite effect, and 
people holding more rightist values are more positive towards gender equality in 1990.  
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6.3 The 1996 survey data: Analysis and discussion 
Table 6.2: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable 
(1996). N: 2293 
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
 B  Beta B  Beta B Beta B Beta 
Ascribed variables         
Age -.024 -.115** -.022 -.101** -.010 -.049** -.011 -.052** 
Gender .913 .163** .913 .163** .959 .171** .970 .173** 
Ethnicity
27
         
White Afrikaans -.149 -.015 -.321 -.032 -.888 .090** -1.081 -.109** 
White English 1.525 .125** 1.251 .102** .570 .047 .467 .038 
Asian .145 .009 .157 .009 -.004 .000 -.031 -.002 
Colored -.747 -.076** -.655 -.067* -.802 -.082** -.875 -.090** 
Semi-ascribed variables         
Urban-Rural   .117 .090** .070 .054 .065 .050 
Religious denomination
28
         
Buddhist   1.096 .014 .922 .012 .862 .011 
Protestant   .422 .074* .395 .069* .255 .045 
Hindu   -1.184 -.056 -1.177 -.056 -1.258 -.060 
Orthodox   1.471 .079** 1.472 .079** 1.375 .074** 
Jew   .635 .072** .613 .070** .514 .058* 
Muslim   .128 .005 .184 .008 .022 .001 
Catholic   .042 .005 -.063 -.008 -.128 -.016 
Region
29
         
KwaZulu-Natal   .816 .114** .849 .119** .739 .104** 
Gauteng   .048 .007 .192 .028 .118 .017 
Mpumalanga   -.855 -.075** -.580 -.051* -.628 -.055* 
Eastern Cape   -.843 -.108** -.647 -.083** -.720 -.093** 
Northern Cape   .341 .013 .411 .016 .364 .014 
Western Cape   -.348 -.039 -.211 -.024 -.220 -.025 
Free State   .327 .030 .422 .039 .273 .025 
North West   -.537 -.055* -.373 -.039 -.385 -.040 
Achieved Variables         
Education     .316 .176** .313 .174** 
Income     .015 .011 .011 .009 
Social Class
30
         
Farmer     -.679 -.031 -.794 -.037 
Skilled Manual     -.160 -.018 -.165 -.019 
Routine Manual      -.507 -.041 -.519 -.042 
Service Class     -.138 -.019 -.149 -.020 
Values          
Postmaterialist index       -.058 -.044* 
Religious-secular       -.031 -.019 
Left-right values       -.095 -.065** 
R2 .063 .112 .132 .137 
Adjusted R2 .061 .104 .121 .125 
Adjusted R2 change  .043 .017 .004 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                                                 
27 “Black” is the reference category. 
28 “No religious denomination” is the reference category. 
29 “Limpopo” is the reference category. 
30 “Unskilled worker” is the reference category. 
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The 1996 model of analysis explains more of the variation than the 1990 model. In step four 
of the analysis with all variables included, adjusted R
2
 is stronger in the 1996 analysis 
compared to in 1990. This change could be due to the inclusion of more independent variables 
adding to the explanation (religious confession, region and the urban-rural dimension). 
Adjusted R
2
 is weak in the first step of the regression analysis, which means that gender, age 
and ethnicity alone explains little of the variations in attitudes towards gender equality. 
Adjusted R
2
 increases from step 1 to step 2, with a significant change of 4, 3 percent. The 
semi-ascribed variables religious confession, the urban-rural dimension and region adds 
substantial information to the variations of the dependent variable. Also in step 3 adjusted R
2
 
increases significantly. However, the change in the adjusted R
2
 is not significant in step 4, 
thus the value-based variables do not explain any of the variation in this analysis.   
Hypothesis 2 can be confirmed for the 1996 data set, there are significant differences between 
older and younger people with regards to attitudes towards gender equality. The causal effect 
of age is -.115, thus younger people are more positive towards gender equality. The direct 
effect of age is much weaker, and a large portion of the age-effect is clearly due to differences 
in other socio-structural factors. However, different values are not the cause. 
Gender has a significant effect on attitudes towards gender equality. The total causal effect is 
beta 0.163. The effect of gender is one of the strongest effects in the 1996 analysis of the data. 
The direct effect of gender is beta .173, thus the effect of gender is slightly strengthened with 
the inclusion of the other variables in step 2, 3 and 4. However, the difference is minimal: 
Women and men have different opinions about gender equality in South Africa, regardless of 
other factors. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed in the 1996 analysis, which confirms that women are 
more likely to be positive towards gender equality than men.  
The hypotheses concerning ethnicity, 4a and 4b, that people of white ethnicity are likely to be 
more positive towards gender equality than people belonging to the black, colored and Asian 
ethnic groups, and that white Afrikaans speaking people are likely to be more negative 
towards gender equality than white English people, are partially confirmed. 
There is a major difference in the effects of white English and white Afrikaans ethnicity. The 
white English speaking ethnic group is strongly and significantly more positive towards 
gender equality than the Black ethnic group in step 1 and step 2 of the analysis. The causal 
effect of English white is b 1.525, and the effect is somewhat weakened when regional and 
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religious variables are included in step 2. However, in step 3, the effect changes and the 
coefficient is no longer significant. This means that the inclusion of social class, income and 
education erases the positive effect of English white ethnicity on gender attitudes, and that 
white English speaking South Africans are in fact no more positive towards gender equality 
positive than black South Africans, they rather have higher education and income. Opposite 
of the results from the 1990 analysis, there are no significant differences between the black 
ethnic group and the Asian ethnic group. However, both the causal and the direct effect of 
colored ethnicity are strong and significant. Coloreds hold more negative attitudes towards 
gender equality than blacks in 1996. 
The coefficient for white Afrikaans is fairly weak and insignificant in step 1 and 2 of the 
analysis. However, with the inclusion of achieved variables in step 3, the effect of white 
Afrikaans ethnical belonging, compared to the reference category Black, is strong and 
significant. The coefficient is negative, which means that people that are white and speak 
Afrikaans as their first language are more negative towards gender equality than Black South 
Africans. The direct effect of this variable is strong and significant (-1.081).  
A quick look at a cross-table between level of education and ethnic group shows that white 
Afrikaners have higher education than the average population sample in this survey.  
Table 6.3: Crosstabulation between education level and ethnicity 
Education level W. Afrikaans W. English Asian Black Colored 
No schooling .0 % .0 % 3.9 % 14.0 % 5.3 % 
Some primary school .0 % .0 % 6.6 % 24.6 % 18.0 % 
Primary school completed .4 % .0 % 10.5 % 12.7 % 10.7 % 
Some high school 23.1 % 12.3 % 38.2 % 36.1 % 43.4 % 
Matric 39.4 % 38.5 % 23.7 % 8.6 % 15.2 % 
Some university 5.8 % 7.0 % 5.3 % 1.1 % 1.2 % 
University degree completed 10.8 % 12.8 % 3.9 % .7 % 2.0 % 
Postgraduate 2.9 % 8.6 % 2.6 % .6 % .0 % 
Other  17.7 % 20.9 % 5.3 % 1.7 % 4.1 % 
Sum (in per cent) 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
 
Since the effect is not significant in step 1 and 2, this means that white Afrikaners are more 
negative towards gender equality than black despite higher education and income levels than 
black South Africans. Thus, when controlling for other factors white Afrikaners hold clearly 
more negative attitudes than black people South Africans. 
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Hypothesis 5: People living in the cities are likely to be more positive than people living in 
the countryside, is not confirmed. The direct effect of the urban-rural dimension is not 
significant. The regression coefficient is significant and positive in step 2, thus, the causal 
effect indicates that people are more positive towards gender equality when living in cities. 
However, this effect is an indirect effect of other variables. This is likely to be explained with 
people living in the cities having higher levels of education, higher levels of income and 
different professions that affect their attitudes towards gender equality.  
In the case of the regional variable, several coefficients are significant: The causal effects of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and the North West are significant. Thus, H6: 
There are no significant differences between different regions in South Africa in terms of 
attitudes towards gender equality, except for the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and 
the Western Cape, where the inhabitants are likely to be more positive towards gender 
equality, is only partially conformed. The results indicate that there are few, but some 
differences between the regions when it comes to attitudes towards gender equality. The 
direct effects of four regions versus Limpopo are all significant and quite strong. People 
living in KwaZulu-Natal are more positive than people living in Limpopo, and people living 
in the three other regions are clearly more negative. Thus the prediction for KZN was correct.  
I do not have the opportunity to study the reasons for these differences, I can only speculate. 
Some of the differences can possibly be explained by a different population living in the 
regions. While in Limpopo almost all people are of black ethnicity, in KwaZulu-Natal there is 
a large white and Asian population. In the analysis, I have not divided ethnicity into all the 
different ethnic groups that reside in South Africa, but it is important to bear in mind that 
these groups have different cultures. In KwaZulu-Natal almost the whole population consists 
of Zulus, and in Limpopo they are mostly Sotho, Tsonga and Venda.  
The hypothesis stating that people that do not belong to a religious denomination are likely to 
have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people that belong to a religious 
denomination is not confirmed in the 1996 analysis. That the Catholics and the Protestants 
are the least negative towards gender equality and that the Muslims are the most negative 
towards gender equality is also not confirmed. The response category “no denomination” is 
used as the reference category, but few of the regression coefficients are significant. There are 
no significant differences between people that have “no denomination” and people that are 
Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or Catholic. However, the causal effect of Protestant, Orthodox and 
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Jew are all significant, and the direct effect of Orthodox and Jew are also significant. People 
belonging to the Orthodox religious tradition are more positive towards gender equality than 
the “no denomination” category in this analysis. The direct effect of “Jew” is also significant, 
but only one Jew participated. The number of the orthodox is also small, with 58 respondents. 
The difference between Protestant and respondents who do not belong to a religion is non-
significant when values are controlled for. Religious confession is not an important factor in 
explaining variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 1996.  
The hypothesis regarding education is confirmed in 1996, where both the causal effect and the 
direct effect are significant. The total causal effect of education on gender equality is beta 
.176. The coefficient is also significant and quite strong in step 4 of the analysis, and most of 
the effect of education is direct in this model, the coefficient is almost the same with the 
inclusion of the value-based variables. People with higher education tend to be more positive 
towards gender equality in South Africa in 1996. 
Neither the causal effect nor the direct effect of income is significant in the analysis for the 
1996 survey, thus there are no differences between people with low and high income with 
regards to attitudes towards gender equality. Hypothesis 10 concerning the effect of social 
class is also not confirmed in this analysis: None of the coefficients are significant. 
The hypothesis regarding the effect of the religious-secular value dimension on gender 
attitudes can not be confirmed in this model, because none of the regression coefficients are 
significant within the 0.05 level of significance. Thus, in 1996, there were no significant 
differences between people holding religious and secular values in this matter. The two other 
hypotheses regarding the effect of values can also not be confirmed. The direct effect of the 
postmaterialist index and the left-right materialist value indices are both significant, but the 
effects are negative. Thus, people with more materialist values are actually more positive than 
people holding postmaterialist values, and people holding right materialist values are more 
positive than people having left materialist values. According to the model used, variations in 
attitudes towards gender equality can mostly be explained by socio-structural variables in 
South Africa in 1996, and gender, education level and region have the strongest effects. 
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6.4 The 2001 survey data: Analysis and discussion 
Table 6.4: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (2001). N: 2485 
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
 B  Beta B  Beta B Beta B Beta 
Ascribed variables         
Age -.015 -.073** -.014 -.070** -.002 -.008 -.003 -.015 
Gender*age -.026 -.184** -.021 -.153** -.023 -.164** -.022 -.160** 
Gender 2.756 .490** 2.554 .454** 2.693 .478** 2.642 .469** 
Ethnicity
31
         
White Afrikaans -.229 -.023 -.546 -.054** -1.359 -.136** -1.318 -.132** 
White English .697 .055** .445 .035 -.461 -.037 -.196 -.016 
Asian .107 .007 -.048 -.003 -.209 -.015 -.220 -.015 
Colored -.293 -.034 -.340 -.039 -.204 -.023 -.237 -.027 
Semi-ascribed Variables         
Urban-Rural dimension   .163 .105** .056 .036 .057 .037 
Religious denomination
32
         
Buddhist   .445 .004 1.075 .009 .848 .007 
Protestant   .009 .002 -.067 -.012 -.251 -.045 
Hindu   .004 .000 -.406 -.020 -.525 -.026 
Independent African Church   -.373 -.049 -.253 -.033 -.385 -.050* 
Orthodox   -.108 -.002 -.271 -.005 -.088 -.001 
Jew   -1.157 -.022 -2.010 -.038* -1.804 -.034 
Muslim   -.319 -.019 -.542 -.033 -.625 -.038 
Other   -.375 -.024 -.424 -.027 -.630 -.040* 
Catholic   -.077 -.009 -.248 -.028 -.362 -.041 
Region
33
         
KwaZulu-Natal   -.041 -.005 .391 .051 .344 .045 
Gauteng   .550 .098 .684 .121* .672 .119 
Mpumalanga   1.432 .064** 1.812 .081** 1.815 .081** 
Eastern Cape   -.772 -.070* -.299 -.027 -.322 -.029 
Northern Cape   -1.340 -.063** -1.177 -.055** -1.082 -.051* 
Western Cape   .008 .001 .077 .009 .022 .003 
Free State   -.559 -.045 -.213 -.017 -.163 -.013 
North West   -.276 -.023 .001 .000 .081 .007 
Achieved Variables         
Education     .414 .236** .396 .226 
Income     .020 .031 .008 .012 
Social Class
34
         
Farmer     .778 .014 .499 .009 
Skilled Manual     .045 .007 .015 .002 
Routine Manual      .145 .015 .068 .007 
Service Class     .214 .030 .121 .017 
Values         
Postmaterialist index       -.002 -.002 
Religious-secular       -.187 -.112** 
Left-right values       -.101 -.072** 
R
2
 .133 .191 .238 .253 
Adjusted R
2
 .130 .182 .228 .242 
Adjusted R
2 
change  .52 .46 .14 
                                                 
31 “Black” is the reference category.     *The coefficient is significant on a 0.05 level (Two-haled test).  
32 “No religious denomination” is the reference category. **The coefficient is significant on the 0.01 level (Two-haled test). 
33 “Limpopo” is the reference category. 
34 “Unskilled manual worker” is the reference category. 
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Adjusted R
2 
is strong and significant in all levels of the sequential analysis for the 2001 data 
set. When only the ascribed social qualities of the respondents are included; gender, age and 
ethnicity, the model explains 13 % of the variance of attitudes towards gender equality. After 
having included all the other variables in the analysis, the full model explains 24, 2 % of the 
variation of the dependent variable.  
Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed in the data from 2001. The causal effect of age on gender 
attitudes is -.073 and significant, which means that when one moves up the scale measuring 
age, the level of gender attitudes descends with 7,3 per cent. The effect of age disappears 
when achieved variables are included and the direct effect of age is not significant. Thus, in 
2001 in South Africa, younger people are more likely to be positive towards gender equality 
than older people, but this is a result of differences in education, income and social class. 
There is statistical interaction between age and gender in the analysis. Thus, there are 
differences between younger men and women and older men and women when it comes to 
attitudes towards gender equality. Also, hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the results of the 
analysis: Women are more likely to have positive attitudes towards gender equality than men. 
The causal effect of gender on attitudes towards gender equality is almost the same as the 
direct effect. The fact that the direct effect of gender is very strong and that the effect of 
gender does not change much in any of the four steps in the analysis, means that women and 
men, regardless of social structure and values, hold different attitudes towards gender equality 
in South Africa in 2001. South African women are almost twice as much more positive than 
South African men.  
Hypothesis 4a and 4b are partially confirmed. Black South Africans are not more likely to be 
negative towards gender equality than white, colored or Asian South Africans. The causal 
effect of white English ethnicity is significant, but this effect disappears when semi-ascribed 
variables are included, thus the effect is indirect. The effect of white Afrikaans is the opposite. 
The causal effect is not significant but the direct effect of white Afrikaans is strong, 
significant and negative: They clearly hold more negative attitudes towards gender equality 
than black South Africans. The direct effect is stronger than the direct causal effect in step 2, 
thus the differences between blacks and white Afrikaners increase when we control for 
education, income and social class. These results confirm what I also found in 1996: The 
causal effect indicates that white English speaking people are more positive towards gender 
equality than Black people, but this effect is in fact due to white English speaking people 
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having a different socio-structural profile, this is not a difference related to cultural belonging. 
Moreover, the results are the opposite for white Afrikaans ethnicity. The direct effect is 
negative and strong, which means that when controlling for other factors, white Afrikaners 
have clearly more negative attitudes towards gender equality than black in South Africa in 
2001. There are also no significant differences between black South Africans and the Asian 
and colored ethnic groups, thus there are no significant results indicating that black South 
Africans is the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality.  
The urban-rural variable is significant in step 2 of the analysis, thus this variable has a causal 
effect on attitudes towards gender equality. People living in the cities are more likely to be 
positive than people living in the countryside. The effect disappears when achieved variables 
are included, thus the effect of urbanism is in fact a result of people living in the cities having 
more education and higher income levels, and belonging to different social classes.  
The hypothesis regarding the regional variables is not confirmed, and there are few of the 
regional variables that have any significant effects on attitudes towards gender equality. 
Mpumalanga and Northern Cape have an effect of gender attitudes versus Limpopo. 
However, no significant positive effects of coming from KZN, Gauteng or the Western Cape 
are present. The results are showing that people living in Mpumalanga have more positive 
attitudes than people living in Limpopo, while people living in Northern Cape have more 
negative attitudes. Thus there are some regional variations in terms of attitudes in South 
Africa.  
Few of the regression coefficients for the different religious denominations are significant, 
thus H7 can only partially be confirmed. The direct effects of Independent African Church, 
Jew and “other” all have significant direct effects versus “no religious denomination”. The 
effects are all negative, thus they hold more negative attitudes towards gender equality than 
the respondents belonging to “no religious denomination”. However, the distribution of the 
respondents on the different denominations is uneven, and only seven respondents are Jews, 
one is a Buddhist and six respondents are Orthodox. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions regarding the effects of these religious denominations on people‟s attitudes 
towards gender equality. Moreover, in 2001 the Protestant and Catholic were not more 
positive towards gender equality than the ones that have “no denomination”.  
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Turning to education, both the total causal- and the direct effect is significant and the 
hypothesis is confirmed. People with higher levels of education have more positive attitudes 
towards gender equality. When controlling for values, however, a small amount of the 
educational effect is an indirect effect via values (beta 0.010).  
The income variable is not significant in 2001, thus H9 is not confirmed.  
In 2001 none of the coefficients for social class are significant. The results show that there are 
no significant differences between the reference category “unskilled worker” and the four 
other social classes in terms of gender attitudes and hypothesis 10 is not confirmed. 
Hypothesis 11 is not confirmed in the 2001 analysis; there are no significant differences 
between people holding materialist values and people holding postmaterialist values.  
The hypotheses regarding religious-secular values and left-right materialist values are also 
unconfirmed. The direct effects of both value dimensions are significant, but negative.  
The total causal effect of religious-secular values is -0.112 and the total causal effect of left-
right values is -0.072. Thus, people with more religious values are more likely to be positive 
towards gender equality than people with secular values, and people with left materialist 
values are more likely to be negative towards gender equality versus people holding right 
materialist values in South Africa in 2001. 
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6.5 The 2007 survey data: Analysis and discussion 
Table 6.5: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (2007). N: 2372 
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
 B  Beta B  Beta B Beta B Beta 
Ascribed variables         
Age -.004 -.023 -.002 -.013 .003 .018 .003 .018 
Gender*Age -.013 -.105 -.015 -.123* -.020 -.160** -.021 -.163** 
Gender*Education .170 .135** .153 .121** -.112 -.088* -.114 -.090* 
Gender 1.467 .262** 1.608 .287** 2.713 .485** 2.720 .486** 
Ethnicity
35
         
White Afrikaans .071 .008 .242 .027 -.133 -.015 -.124 -.014 
White English .719 .069** .666 .064** .200 .019 .226 .022 
Asian .496 .035 -.358 -.025 -.519 -.036 -.502 -.035 
Colored .152 .017 .701 .076** .555 .060* .560 .061* 
Semi-ascribed variables         
Urban-Rural   .073 .049 .037 .025 .035 .023 
Region
36
         
KwaZulu-Natal   1.082 .153** 1.075 .152** 1.065 .151** 
Gauteng   .335 .055 .313 .052 .324 .053 
Mpumalanga   .278 .022 .364 .028 .378 .029 
Eastern Cape   .232 .026 .226 .026 .227 .026 
Northern Cape   -1.327 -.065** -1.321 -.065** -1.310 -.065** 
Western Cape   -.330 -.039 -.300 -.036 -.306 -.036 
Free State   -.475 -.043 -.399 -.036 -.389 -.035 
North West   .515 .047 .560 .051 .570 .052 
Religious confession
37
         
Buddhist   .960 .019 1.089 .021 1.070 .021 
Protestant   .041 .007 .009 .002 -.042 -.008 
Hindu   .128 .007 -.036 -.002 -.075 -.004 
Independent African Church   -.290 -.035 -.284 -.034 -.330 -.040 
Orthodox   -.424 -.022 -.454 -.024 -.510 -.027 
Muslim   .078 .004 -.001 .000 -.055 -.003 
Other    -.175 -.014 -.246 -.020 -.294 -.023 
Catholic   -.158 -.018 -.182 -.021 -.213 -.025 
Achieved Variables         
Education level     .269 .184** .269 .184** 
Income level     -.071 -.060** -.068 -.057* 
Social Class
38
         
Farmer     .213 .006 .195 .006 
Skilled Manual     .200 .026 .192 .025 
Routine Manual      .675 .072** .656 .070** 
Service Class     .591 .090** .583 .089** 
Values         
Postmaterialist index       -.017 -.012 
Religious-secular values       -.051 -.028 
Left-right values       .011 .006 
R
2 
.097 .129 .155 .156 
Adjusted R
2
  .094 .120 .144 .144 
Change adjusted R  .026 .024 .000 
                                                 
35 “Black” ethnic group is the reference category.   *The coefficient is significant on a 0.05 level (Two-haled test). 
36 “Limpopo” is the reference category.    **The coefficient is significant on the 0.01 level (Two-haled test). 
37 “Not religious” is the reference category. 
38 “Unskilled manual worker” is the reference category. 
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The 2007 regression model of analysis explains less than the 2001 model. Adjusted R
2 
is 
significant in step 1-3 of the analysis, but there is no significant change in the adjusted R
2 
when the value dimensions are included in the analysis. Thus, in 2007, the value dimensions 
can not explain any of the variation in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa.  
In addition, the model explains significantly less than the same model used in 2001, which 
indicates that other factors are becoming more important for the understanding of the 
development in South Africa when it comes to gender equality.  
The increase in R
2 
is significant when the semi-ascribed variables are included in the model, 
and increases additionally when the achieved variables are included. In sum, the model with 
the socio-structural independent variables included explains 14, 4 % of the variance within 
attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 2007. 
The causal effect of age is not significant, thus hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. Older people 
are not more negative towards gender equality than younger people. Knowing that the age 
coefficient was significant in the bivariate analysis performed in chapter five, this means that 
the bivariate effect of age is in fact something disappearing when controlling for other factors. 
This means that the generational effect found in previous years is no longer present.  
The variable measuring the statistical interaction between age and gender is significant, thus, 
there are differences between young women and old women and young and old men with 
regards to gender equality.  
A cross table between age groups and educational level confirms that the differences are 
substantial. The number of older people with high levels of education is clearly much lower. 
On the other hand, the differences within the different levels of income are not very large. 
This means that despite these differences, age is not an important explanation factor. 
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Table 6.6: Cross tabulation between age and level of education 
Education level* Age recoded** 
 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and more 
1 Low 2.3 7.4 14.0 20.9 32.4 40.4 
2 3.4 3.3 8.1 14.4 10.1 10.4 
3 .6 1.1 2.2 .5 1.0 1.5 
4 5.4 12.0 10.9 10.1 9.5 5.2 
5 53.0 32.4 29.3 30.0 24.2 21.5 
6 31.3 37.4 24.9 15.1 15.7 14.1 
7 1.1 .0 .5 .8 .3 .4 
8 High 3.0 6.4 10.1 8.3 6.9 6.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Based on the variable x025 “Highest educational level attained”. ** Measured in years 
 
Table 6.7: Cross tabulation between age and income level. 
Income level** Age recoded* 
 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and more  
1 Low 11.5 12.9 10.1 12.7 15.2 11.1 
2 10.7 7.6 8.3 8.0 8.3 9.9 
3 9.7 9.0 10.6 11.4 8.7 8.7 
4 9.1 12.5 11.2 10.6 16.6 11.9 
5 17.8 16.4 18.3 13.8 12.5 17.5 
6 15.1 12.9 15.1 15.4 11.1 13.9 
7 16.0 13.1 12.7 13.0 13.5 12.7 
8 6.2 11.1 8.6 9.3 10.4 9.5 
9 1.4 2.7 2.9 3.2 .3 1.6 
10 High 2.6 1.7 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Measured in years. **Based on the variable x047cs “Income”. 
 
Hypothesis 3, women are more likely to have positive attitudes than men, is confirmed in all 
steps of the analysis. The total causal effect of gender is beta .262. The direct effect of gender 
is much stronger, when all the other independent variables are included in the model; the 
effect is almost the double. Gender has a very strong effect on attitudes towards gender 
equality, women are clearly more positive, and the effect strengthens when I control for 
income, education and social class. In addition, the interaction effect of gender and education 
is significant, which means that there are differences between women with higher education 
and women with lower education with regards to gender attitudes. 
Hypothesis 4a states that South African white people are likely to be more positive towards 
gender equality than South Africans who belong to the three other ethnic groups: black, 
colored and Asian. In addition, black people are likely to be the ones with the most negative 
attitudes towards gender equality. This is not confirmed in the 2007 dataset. There are no 
significant differences between black South Africans, Asian and white Afrikaans speaking 
South Africans when it comes to gender attitudes in 2007.  
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The causal effect of “colored” is not significant, but the effect of being colored versus black is 
significant in step 2, 3 and 4 of the analysis. Thus, coloreds are more positive towards gender 
equality than blacks when semi-ascribed variables are controlled for. The variables measuring 
religious denomination are not significant, so place of habitation is likely to be the relevant 
factor in determining the differences between coloreds and blacks in 2007. The direct effect of 
colored versus black is .560, but the regression coefficient decreases when other variables are 
introduced in step 3, thus the effect is somewhat evened out with education, income and 
social class.  
The causal effect of white English ethnicity versus black is strong and significant. The effect 
remains strong, also when semi-ascribed variables are included. However, again the positive 
effect of white English vanishes when education, income and social class are controlled for. 
The positive effect being white and English speaking has on attitudes towards gender equality 
is a result of differences in income, education and belonging to social class compared to being 
black.  
Hypothesis 5, regarding the urban-rural dimension is not confirmed. The effect of this 
variable is not significant, indicating that there are no differences between people living in 
cities and people living on the countryside.  
Also H6 is partially confirmed, there are only a few differences between people living in 
various regions in South Africa in 2007 with regards to gender attitudes. However, the 
regional differences are minimal. Out of the seven regional variables, only two have 
significant effects versus the reference category, Limpopo. People living in KwaZulu-Natal 
are more positive towards gender equality than people living in Limpopo and people living in 
the Northern Cape are clearly more negative towards gender equality than the citizens of 
Limpopo. Both effects stay more or less the same through all three steps of the analysis. Thus 
one of the regions expected has more positive attitudes, but not Gauteng and Western Cape.  
Hypothesis 7 is not confirmed, there are no significant differences between people who do not 
belong to a religious denomination, and people that do belong to a religious denomination 
when it comes to gender attitudes. None of the coefficients are significant in the analysis.  
Further on, hypothesis 8 is confirmed: There is a positive and significant relationship between 
level of education and attitudes towards gender equality in 2007. Both the total causal effect 
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of education and the direct effect is .184, which means that including value-based variables in 
the model does not change the effect of education level on the dependent variable. People 
with higher education levels are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards gender equality 
in South Africa in 2007, and education level is the strongest direct effect in the 2007 analysis. 
H9, that people with higher income are likely to be more positive towards gender equality 
than people with low income, is not confirmed in the analysis. The results show that people 
with higher income levels actually are more negative towards gender equality. However, the 
effect of income is weak.  
The hypothesis regarding social class is confirmed in 2007. There are no significant 
differences between people belonging to the unskilled workers class and farmers and skilled 
manual workers. However the causal effect of both routine manual workers and the service 
class are positive. People belonging to these social classes are more positive towards gender 
equality. The direct effect is the same as the causal effect, thus these variations are not 
changed by the value dimensions. The coefficients show that the routine manual workers are 
the ones who hold the most positive attitudes.  
All the three hypothesis regarding values are unconfirmed: None of the coefficients are 
significant in the 2007 analysis of attitudes towards gender equality. This confirms what the 
results of the test of the adjusted R
2 
already showed: In 2007 in South Africa attitudes towards 
gender equality can be explained by socio-structural variations but they not be explained by 
value differences.  
6.6 Main findings 
Both the results from the bivariate analyses in chapter five and the analyses in this chapter 
indicate than structural explanations are better than value-based explanations for 
understanding variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa. The hypothesis 
regarding the three value dimensions are only confirmed in the 1990 dataset, and only two out 
of three. South Africa has not experienced a value shift in the period studied according to my 
findings. In addition, people were actually more postmaterialist in 1990 than in 2007, which is 
the opposite result of what I expected to find. 
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The structural explanations are quite suitable for understanding the development in South 
Africa in this time period. The differences between men and women when it comes to 
attitudes towards gender equality have become larger over time, while age differences have 
become smaller. The education variable is the most stable in the analysis: Higher levels of 
education have a clearly significant effect on gender attitudes. Social class has not been a 
determining factor, but this effect is stronger in 2007. Income level is on the other hand not a 
good explanation factor in explaining variations in gender attitudes in South Africa.  
The hypothesis regarding place of habitation were only partially confirmed. Where the 
respondents live in South Africa is significant, but is affected by the fact that you find higher 
education levels and more access to different types of work in the urban areas. However, there 
are few stable regional differences to be found.  
Also when it comes to religious denomination, this is not a strong explanation variable, and 
there are no consistent patterns indicating that people belonging to specific religions are more 
positive than others. This effect is less important in 2001 and 2007 than in the previous years.  
When it comes to ethnicity, some patterns can be seen. White English speaking are more 
positive towards gender equality than black South Africans, but that is a result of education 
levels, income and social class. White Afrikaners are on the other hand, more negative, 
regardless of other factors. The results for coloreds and Asians are not consistent over time, 
but black people are clearly not more negative than any of the other ethnic groups, when 
controlling for education, income and social class.  
The fourth hypothesis concerns the ethnicity of the South African population and states that 
the white population of South Africa has moved towards more gender equal attitudes, while in 
the black population‟s attitudes towards gender equality have not remarkably changed since 
the transition. This hypothesis is not confirmed. Black people do not hold more negative 
attitudes than the other ethnicities, and this has not changed over time. Thus, the differences 
found are not due to cultural differences. However, there are differences within the two main 
cultural belongings in the white ethnic group; The Afrikaners and the English.   
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7 Concluding remarks 
The idea behind this master thesis was to examine the developments in South Africa with 
regards to attitudes towards gender equality. In the first chapters, I described how South 
African women have achieved political gender empowerment and increased gender equality. 
At the same time, South Africa has gone through many developments in their political and 
economical situation. It is an established fact that South Africa has achieved a great deal of 
gender equality on an aggregate level over this time period. More women are receiving higher 
education and are included in the work force. These improvements I described in chapter 
three. At the same time, South African women are still experiencing gender related 
discrimination; South Africa is still a traditional society, and women are in a weak position 
due to an extreme level of gender related violence. Knowing this, I wanted to understand if 
there is a relationship between the number of women found in the parliament today, and the 
potential attitude change over time. I found that the changes on the national level are elite-
initiated, but I was wondering if these changes towards gender equality have “trickled down” 
on the attitudes of the population as such.  
The first research question addressed was whether attitudes towards gender equality have 
changed over time. The answer to this question is that people were more positive towards 
gender equality in 2007 than in 1990, but they were in fact less positive in 2007 than in 2001. 
In addition, the attitudes have not changed much over time, except for the change from 1990 
to 1994. The early change could perhaps be a result of many changes in the political system at 
the time, including the end of racial discrimination and a massive increase in the female 
political representation. 
The second research question I addressed was: What can explain variations in attitudes 
towards gender equality in South Africa? In relation to this, I presented two different types of 
explanations, and I wanted to examine which of the two provided the best explanation model 
for attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa: A social structure based explanation 
and a value-based explanation. I have found the answer to this question by running bivariate 
and multivariate analyses with both socio-structural and value-based variables included.  
The answer to the last question addressed is that the value-based model cannot explain much 
of the variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in this time period. The 
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structural explanation model explains much more, but the explanation potential of this model 
is also inadequate when we look at the changes I found over time. In 2007 the variables I 
included in the model explained only a small amount of the variation in attitudes towards 
gender equality.   
7.1 Overview: Hypotheses and findings 
Below is a table presenting the hypotheses for all four years, providing an overview over the 
findings from the analyses. Firstly I present a table with a repetition of the fifteen hypotheses 
presented in chapter two: 
Table 6.8 Hypotheses overview 
  
H1 In South Africa, there has been a positive shift since the democratic transition, and South Africans have 
become steadily more positive towards gender equality. 
H2 Younger people are more likely to have positive attitudes than older people. 
H3 Women are more likely to have positive attitudes than men. 
H4 White South Africans are likely to be more positive than black, coloreds and Asians. Black South Africans 
are likely to be the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality. 
H4B White Afrikaans speaking South Africans are likely to be more negative towards gender equality than 
white English speaking South Africans. 
H4C The white population of South Africa has gained more positive attitudes over time, while in the black 
population attitudes towards gender equality have not remarkably changed since the transition.  
H5 People living in the cities are likely to be more positive than people living in the countryside. 
H6 There are no significant differences between different regions in South Africa in terms of attitudes 
towards gender equality, except for the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape, 
where the inhabitants are likely to be more positive towards gender equality.  
H7 People that do not belong to a religious denomination are likely to have more positive attitudes towards 
gender equality than people that belong to a religious denomination Moreover; I expect to find that the 
Catholics and the Protestants are the least negative towards gender equality and that the Muslims are 
the most negative towards gender equality. 
H8 People with higher levels of education are likely to be more positive than people with lower levels of 
education. 
H9 People with higher levels of income are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people 
with lower levels of income. 
H10 Respondents belonging to the unskilled workers class and farmers are likely to be the most negative 
towards gender equality. South Africans who are routine employees or belong to the service class have 
more positive attitudes towards gender attitudes than persons belonging to the other social classes. 
H11 People with post-materialist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people 
with materialist values. 
H12 People with secular values are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than 
people with religious values. 
H13 People with leftist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with 
rightist values. 
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Table 6.9: Overview: Hypotheses confirmed? 
  Hypothesis confirmed? 
 1990 1996 2001 2007 
 Yes No Partially Yes No Partially Yes  No  Partially Yes  No  Partially 
H1 Time - - - - - - - - - - - - 
H2 Age X   X     X  X  
H3 Gender  X   X   X   X   
H4A Ethnicity  X    X   X   X 
H4B Ethnicity - - - X     X   X 
H4C Ethnicity/time  X   X   X   X  
H5 Urban-Rural - - -  X    X  X  
H6 Region - - -   X  X    X 
H7 Religion   X  X    X  X  
H8 Education X   X   X   X   
H9 Income  X   X   X   X  
H10 Class     X   X  X   
H11 MPM X    X   X   X  
H12 Religious-
secular 
X    X   X   X  
H13 Rightist-Leftist   X   X   X   X  
 
I have found that if value change is a part of the modernization process, as stated by Inglehart 
(1997), South Africa is likely only to be in the initial faze of the modernization process, and 
the society has not yet gone through a cultural change which has led to value changes. The 
three values dimensions proved to give weak and insignificant results in the analyses on South 
African society in this time period. The materialist-postmaterialist dimension only gave the 
predicted results for the analysis of the 1990 dataset, which is indicating that postmaterialist 
values had a stronger effect on gender attitudes before the democratic transition, than after.  
The value-based explanations are created for, and mostly tested on countries in the 
industrialized world. Thus I have confirmed that these explanation models using value 
dimensions are not suitable for explaining attitude change in a developing country at the stage 
South Africa is at. 
I have found that age explains less over time and that gender explains more over time. 
Moreover, education is the most important explanation factor when it comes to attitudes 
towards gender equality. Thus, as more and more women are receiving higher education and 
entering all levels of the work force, perhaps this will lead to a change in the attitudes towards 
gender equality both among men and women. Whether this also is going to change the values 
of the South African citizens, only time will show.  
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South Africa is a country in its pre-industrial country phase of development, where the 
majority of the population is living under basic standards. South Africa is currently going 
through modernization, industrialization and structural changes. The country has a recent past 
of apartheid and different societal groups still live under varied social standards. The white 
minority which was the elite before democratization is still largely the economical elite. A 
large percentage of the South African population live under poor conditions and still family 
relations are traditional. With regards to the topic of gender equality, this status of South 
Africa also presented the paradox: They have managed to recruit women largely into politics 
and into other arenas where women usually are underrepresented in traditional societies.  
My analysis has showed that the elite-initiated female empowerment has not led to more 
positive attitudes towards gender equality in the South African population in the time period 
studied. It appears that South Africa needs more time in order to achieve more positive 
attitudes towards gender equality among its citizens. My analysis does not provide any 
solution to this future development, however it appears that education is a key to attitude 
change, in addition to bringing women into all sectors of employment.  
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